DELHI HIGH COURT 

ARVIND KEJRIWAL  🆚  STATE AND ANR CRLMC 6343/19 Justice Swarna Kant Sharma 

Sectiona 499 IPC Defamation – Whether ‘retweeting’ a defamatory content amounts to ‘publication’ under Section 499 of IPC, and whether the petitioner, who is not the original author of the content, can be summoned for defamation – The petitioner, who is the Chief Minister of Delhi, had retweeted a video posted by another person on YouTube, which allegedly contained defamatory statements against the respondent, who is the founder of a social media page supporting the Prime Minister of India – The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for defamation under Section 499/500 of IPC – The petitioner challenged the summoning order on the grounds that the retweet did not constitute defamation, as it did not have any intention or knowledge to harm the respondent’s reputation, and that the petitioner was not the original author or publisher of the content – The petitioner also argued that the respondent had earlier withdrawn a Similar complaint against him, which amounted to acquittal under Section 257 of Cr.P.C – The respondent contended that the retweet was defamatory, as it lowered his reputation in the eyes of the public, and that the petitioner had a large following on Twitter, which amplified the impact of the retweet – The respondent also argued that the earlier withdrawal of the complaint was due to the lack of jurisdiction of the court, and that it did not bar the subsequent prosecution of the petitioner – The reach and influence of the person retweeting the defamatory content, and the potential harm caused to the reputation of the aggrieved person, and holds that the petitioner, being a Chief Minister with a large social media following, cannot escape liability by merely contending that he had no malicious intent or knowledge of the defamatory content – It is difficult to erase the reputational injury from public memory, as the tweets may be deleted but perceptions are difficult to be deleted from the minds of the community – This Court, thus, for the purpose of adjudicating the present case, holds that retweeting a content, which is allegedly defamatory, on the Twitter account and projecting it to be as if his own views, will prima facie attract the liability under Section 499 of IPC, for the purpose of issuance of summons – Therefore, this Court finds no infirmity with the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court as well as learned Sessions Court – Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed – It is, however, clarified that the observations made hereinabove qua the present complaint case are solely for the purpose of deciding the instant petition challenging the summoning orders, and the same shall not be construed as opinion of this Court on the merits of the case, which will be adjudicated upon during the course of trial.

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ARVIND KEJRIWAL VERSUS STATE & ANR THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT

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