THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(2023) 1 ApexCourtJudgments(SC) 58 : (2023) 1 CriCC 26 : (2023) 1 KHC 418 : (2023) 1 MadWN(Cri) 337 : (2023) 1 RCR(Criminal) 762

GUDDAN @ROOP NARAYAN Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN — Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 2023 (@ SLP (Criminal) No. 9756 of 2022)

DATE OF DECISION:- 03-01-2023

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Sections 439 and 389 – Bail – While granting bail/suspension of sentence, excessive conditions cannot be imposed – Conditions for bail cannot become so onerous that their tantamount amounts to bail denial – This Court, time and time again has held that jail is the exception and grant of bail is the rule, and in such a scenario, the conditions imposed on bail must not be unreasonable*_

ORDER

1. The present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant herein against the impugned order dated 20.09.2022 passed by the High Court Of Rajasthan in S.B. CA No. 360/2019. The Appellant herein is seeking for a waiver of the conditions imposed on the grant of suspension of sentence by the impugned order*_

_*2. We had already on 03.01.2023 passed an order allowing the Appeal and waiving off the conditions of bail. We are now giving reasons for the same*_

_*3. Briefly, the facts relevant for the purpose of this Appeal are as follows*_

_*3.1. It is alleged that the complainant, on the date of the incident, was assaulted on the head with an iron rod by the Appellant, causing the complainant to be admitted to the hospital*_

_*3.2. The complainant then registered an FIR against the Appellant u/s 341 & 323 of the IPC. A chargesheet was subsequently filed against the Appellant u/s 341,323,325 and 307 IPC*_

_*4. The Ld. Trial Court, vide order dated 20.02.2019 convicted the appellant u/s 307,323 and 341 of the IPC on grounds of the recoveries made, the eyewitnesses to the incident and the medical evidence. The Appellant was thus sentenced to 10 years Imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,00,000- with default sentence u/s 307 along with 1 year Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000- with default sentence u/s 323 and a 1 month Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- u/s 341 of the IPC*_

5. The Appellant then preferred an Appeal before the High Court, and during the pendency of the Appeal preferred an Application for Suspension of Sentence.

6. The High Court, vide impugned order dated 20.09.2022 suspended the sentence of the Appellant, however imposed strict conditions of deposit of fine amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- along with a surety of Rs. 1,00,000/- and two bail bonds of Rs. 50,000/- each.

7. These conditions imposed by the High Court for the grant of suspension of sentence are being challenged in the present Appeal.

8. We have heard the arguments of both the parties in detail.

9. This Court, time and time again has held that jail is the exception and grant of bail is the rule, and in such a scenario, the conditions imposed on bail must not be unreasonable.

10. In the case of Munish Bhasin and Others Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and Another (2009) 4 SCC 45, the Appellant had approached the Supreme Court in Appeal against an order of the High Court that had imposed onerous conditions for grant of Anticipatory Bail in a Domestic Violence case. This Hon’ble Court in its reasoning held that harsh and excessive conditions cannot be imposed while granting bail, the relevant observations of this Court are reproduced hereunder:

’10. It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all.

12. While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the court under Section 438 of the Code, the court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under Section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code.’

11. In the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2012) 1 SCC 40, while hearing a bail Application in a case of an alleged economic offence, this court held that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. It was observed as under:

’21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.

25. The provisions of CrPC confer discretionary jurisdiction on criminal courts to grant bail to the accused pending trial or in appeal against convictions; since the jurisdiction is discretionary, it has to be exercised with great care and caution by balancing the valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of the society in general. In our view, the reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge, which is affirmed by the High Court, in our opinion, is a denial of the whole basis of our system of law and normal rule of bail system. It transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent until he is found guilty. If such power is recognised, then it may lead to chaotic situation and would jeopardise the personal liberty of an individual.

27. This Court, time and again, has stated that bail is the rule and committal to jail an exception. It has also observed that refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.’

12. Further, in the case of Sandeep Jain Vs. National Capital Territory of Delhi (2000) 2 SCC 66, this Court, while hearing a bail application held that conditions for grant of bail cannot become so onerous that their existence itself is tantamount to refusal of bail. This Court held as under:

‘We are unable to appreciate even the first order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate imposing the onerous condition that an accused at the FIR stage should pay a huge sum of Rs 2 lakhs to be set at liberty. If he had paid it is a different matter. But the fact that he was not able to pay that amount and in default thereof he is to languish in jail for more than 10 months now, is sufficient indication that he was unable to make up the amount. Can he be detained in custody endlessly for his inability to pay the amount in the range of Rs 2 lakhs? If the cheques issued by his surety were dishonoured, the Court could perhaps have taken it as a ground to suggest to the payee of the cheques to resort to the legal remedies provided by law. Similarly if the Court was dissatisfied with the conduct of the surety as for his failure to raise funds for honouring the cheques issued by him, the Court could have directed the appellant to substitute him with another surety. But to keep him in prison for such a long period, that too in a case where bail would normally be granted for the offences alleged, is not only hard but improper. It must be remembered that the Court has not even come to the conclusion that the allegations made in the FIR are true. That can be decided only when the trial concludes, if the case is charge-sheeted by the police.’

13. In the present case, the Appellant has been granted bail by the High Court. However, while granting bail, the High Court has imposed the excessive conditions of a deposit of fine amount of Rs.1,00,000/- along with a surety of another Rs.1,00,000/- and two further bail bonds of Rs.50,000/- each.

14. We are unable to appreciate the excessive conditions of bail imposed by the High Court. The fact that bail has been granted to the Appellant herein is proof enough to show that he is not to be languishing in jail during the pendency of the case.

15. While bail has been granted to the Appellant, the excessive conditions imposed have, in-fact, in practical manifestation, acted as a refusal to the grant of bail. If the Appellant had paid the required amount, it would have been a different matter. However, the fact that the Appellant was not able to pay the amount, and in default thereof is still languishing in jail, is sufficient indication that he was not able to make up the amount.

16. As has been stated in the Sandeep Jain case (supra), the conditions of bail cannot be so onerous that their existence itself tantamounts to refusal of bail. In the present case, however, the excessive conditions herein have precisely become that, an antithesis to the grant of bail.

17. Any other accused in a similar circumstance at this point would not be in custody, however, the present Appellant, because of the conditions imposed, has not been able to leave the languish of jail. Can the Appellant, for not being able to comply with the excessive requirements, be detained in custody endlessly? To keep the Appellant in jail, that too in a case where he normally would have been granted bail for the alleged offences, is not just a symptom of injustice, but injustice itself.

18. Ld. Sr. Counsel Manish Singhvi, appearing on behalf of the State of Rajasthan on the basis of instructions has also very fairly conceded to the point that the conditions of bail are excessive and the appellant is in no financial condition to satisfy the conditions. We deeply appreciate his role as an officer of the court for his unbiased attitude in the matter.

19. We, therefore, allow this Appeal and set out to modify the bail order granted by the High Court. The Bail order is to continue, however, the conditions set for the grant of Bail stands waived off.

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Guddan @Roop Narayan. State Of Rajasthan Supreme Court of India judgment on bail

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Ghan vs State Of HP CRLA 311/21 06/01/23 [ SABINA JJ ]

[ HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT ]

• Section 376 IPC POCSO ACT Section 4B Section 437A CRPC Conviction Sustainability Penetrative sexual assault Appreciation of evidence Held, prosecution required to establish its case against accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt Victim not supported prosecution case during trial nor scientific evidence corroborates prosecution case PW-3 deposed as per information given to her by complainant and not by victim herself PW-7 also deposed with regard to facts narrated by complainant and not by victim herself Conviction of appellant only on basis of testimony of complainant as possibility that she might have falsely involved accused in this case on account of domestic violence cannot be ruled out Thus, accused acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt Accused directed to furnish personal bond in sum of Rs.25,000/and surety in like amount. [Paras 21 to 26 and 28]

Relevant Paras:

21. Thus, in the present case, victim has not supported the prosecution case during trial nor the scientific evidence corroborates the prosecution case.

22. PW-3 Guddi Devi, deposed that she was working as Mid-Day-Meal Helper at Government Primary School, Nohra Khandol. In the year 2016, victim was a student of 2nd Class and during school hours she used to observe that the victim remained quite and scared. On inquiry made from the mother of the victim, it transpired that the father of the victim was doing wrong acts with her. In her cross-examination, she deposed that the appellant had not molested anyone in her presence. She admitted that the appellant was a drunkard and troubled his family and parents for the last many years. Thus, so far as the statement of PW-3 Guddi Devi is concerned, she has deposed as per information given to her by the mother of the victim and not by the victim herself.

23. PW-7 Rajat Sharma, deposed that the appellant was his father and the victim was younger daughter of the appellant. He came to know from his mother that something wrong had happened with his sister and his mother made reference of involvement of her father. His mother had told him that the victim complained of pain in her private part. In his cross-examination, he deposed that no one from the village had ever complained with regard to the act and conduct of the appellant. Appellant used to take drinks and created nuisance after consuming alcohol. His mother and grand-father had reported the matter to the local Panchayat against the appellant for creating nuisance at home. Thus, so far as the PW-7 Rajat Sharma is concerned, he has also deposed with regard to the facts narrated to him by his mother (complainant) and not by the victim herself.

24. Thus, in the present case, we are only left with the testimony of the complainant PW-2 Hem Lata, mother of the victim, who has supported the prosecution case during trial while appearing in the witness-box. As per the prosecution witnesses, appellant is a drunkard and creates nuisance at home under the influence of liquor. It has also been admitted by complainant PW-2 that the appellant indulged in domesticviolence. Since in the present case, the victim has not supported the prosecution case and the scientific evidence also does not corroborate the prosecution case, it would not be safe to base conviction of the appellant only on the basis of the testimony of PW-2 Hem Lata (complainant), as the possibility that she might have falsely involved the appellant in this case on account of domestic violence meted out to her, cannot be ruled out.
25. It is a settled proposition of law that prosecution is required to establish its case against an accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Whenever doubt arises in the prosecution case, benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused.
26. After considering the entire evidence on record, we are of the opinion that in the present case, the prosecution story is rendered doubtful. Hence, the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the charge framed against him by giving him benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court Solan, District Solan, H.P., in Sessions TrialNo.21-S/7 of 2020/2017, dated 23rd July, 2021, are set aside. Appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him.

28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety in the like amount before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.

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Judgment Ghan Shyam Versus State of Himachal Pradesh

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Major vs State Of Punjab CRMM 25822/23 22/05/23 [ HARPREET JJ ]

[ PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT ]

• Sections 73, 446 and 482 CRPC Forfeiture of surety bond Mere absence of the accused on one date before trial Court in itself is not sufficient to conclude that he is evading his arrest and cannot be sole ground for issuance of non bailable warrants Courts can most certainly take into consideration conduct of accused if he is impeding progress of trial and is on earlier occasion he was declared proclaimed offender and on account of his continuous absence from trial, trial considerably protracted and his past behaviour is relevant for purpose of recording satisfaction under relevant provisions of Code – Hence, forfeiture and cancellation of surety bonds including issuance of nonbailable warrants set aside.

29. In view of the factual position of the law discussed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that for passing any orders in terms of Section 73(1), Section 82(1), Section 446 of the Code, the recording of the satisfaction with regard to evading of the arrest, the willful concealment and breach of the conditions of the bail bond is absolutely necessary. The constitutional protection provided under Article 21 requires that the accused must be granted opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice before any adverse order curtailing a person’s liberty is passed. The Courts cannot issue non bailable warrants in a routine manner without following the drill prescribed under the Code. The Court is required to record its satisfaction on the basis of material available on record and atleast assign reasons for concluding that the accused is willfully evading his arrest and the warrants cannot be executed. The non-bailable warrants are only to be issued after exhausting the other methods of securing the presence of the accused. Mere absence of the accused on one date before the trial Court in itself is not sufficient to conclude that he is evading his arrest and cannot be the sole ground for issuance of non bailable warrants. The Courts can most certainly take into consideration the conduct of the accused if he is impeding the progress of the trial and is on earlier occasion he was declared a proclaimed offender and on account of his continuous absence from the trial, the trial has been considerably protracted. His past behaviour is a relevant for the purpose of recording satisfaction under the relevant provisions of the Code.

30. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has not followed the drill of the procedure provided under Sections 73, 82, 446 of the Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin Vs. Union of India 2020(3) SCC 637 has laid down the ratio that the procedural safeguards provided under the statute are required ot be mandatorily followed and following was observed:
“98. We also direct that all the above procedural safeguards, as elucidated by us, need to be mandatorily followed. In this context, this Court in the Hukam Chand Shyam Lal case (supra), observed as follows:
“18. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other amodes (sic) of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature…” (emphasis supplied).”
31. The sole purpose for cancellation of bail bonds or issuance of proclamation is to secure presence of the accused. The petitioner in the present case undertakes to appear before the learned trial Court on each and every date.
32. The learned State counsel is not able to controvert the factual position as well as the settled law on the issue at hand.
CONCLUSION
33. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 20.12.2022 and 03.04.2023 Annexure P-5 and P-6, respectively, passed by the learned trial Court are set aside and the petitioner is directed to appear before the learned trial Court on or before 03.07.2023 and on his doing so the learned trial Court shall admit him to bail on furnishing of fresh bail

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CRM-M_25822_2023_22_05_2023_FINAL_ORDER Major Singh @ Major vs State of Punjab

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