MEHBOOB ALI …PETITIONER(S) Vs.
NISAR FATIMA ….RESPONDENT(S)

CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE CRM(M) No.265/2022👨‍⚖️ 

Slapping a wife in a public setting does not constitute the offence of violating a woman’s modesty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code./J&K High Court 

The petitioner, husband of the respondent, claims to have filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent/wife and the respondent/wife too has filed a suit for cancellation of the marriage
agreement executed between the parties. It is stated that while the above-mentioned litigations were pending between the parties, the respondent, at the behest of her family members, filed a false and
flimsy complaint before the learned trial court which referred the same to the concerned police for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C.
CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 2 of 4 After the report in terms of Section 202 of Cr. P. C was submitted by
the police, the learned trial court vide order dated 30.03.2022, issued process against the petitioner for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC.

7) The perusal of the complaint reveals that the respondent moved an application for initiation of criminal proceedings/lodging of FIR against the petitioner alleging therein that when she had come to the Court on 19.03.2022, the petitioner thrashed her, as a result of which she got injured and he also slapped the respondent in public gaze. The learned trial court recorded the statement of the respondent who was identified by her counsel and the trial court thereafter in its wisdom deem it proper to refer the complaint to SHO, P/S Pulwama for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C. The SHO, P/S Pulwama, submitted a report before the trial court and by placing reliance upon the said report, the trial court issued the process against the petitioner
for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC. As rightly conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, from the averments made in the complaint, no offence under Section 354 IPC is made out but offence under Section 323 IPC is made out as the respondent has categorically stated that she was thrashed and slapped in public gaze by the petitioner when she had come to attend the
proceedings.

8) The trial court record reveals that before the matter was referred for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C, the statement of the CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 4 of 4 complainant was recorded by the learned Magistrate, as such, there is no force in the contention raised by the petitioner.
9) For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that order dated 30.03.2022, so far as issuance of process for commission of offence under Section 354 IPC is concerned, the same
is not sustainable in the eyes of law and, accordingly, the same is quashed whereas the order impugned to the extent of issuance of process under Section 323 IPC is upheld. The petition is, accordingly,
disposed of. The interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. The trial court shall proceed ahead with the proceedings in accordance with law.

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MEHBOOB ALI Vs. NISAR FATIMA JUDGMENT THE LAW LITERATES J &k HIGH COURT

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SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMED & ANR. 

CORAM: (Delhi High Court)
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR

Delhi Rent Control Act Section 14(1)(e) Eviction petition The petitioner challenges the order of the Rent Controller that dismissed his application to be impleaded as a party in an eviction petition filed by the respondent no.1, against the respondent no.2, who is the petitioner’s brother and one of the legal heirs of their deceased father – The petitioner claims to be the owner and exclusive possessor of the suit property, which is a shop and a workshop, by way of adverse possession of the evacuee property and relinquishment deeds executed by the other legal heirs of his father – He alleges that the respondent no.1 and 2 have colluded to create a false landlord-tenant relationship and seeks to join the eviction petition to protect his rights – The respondent no.1 contends that he is the landlord of the suit property and that ‘father of Petitioner’ was his tenant till his death, after which the tenancy devolved upon the respondent no.21. – He argues that the petitioner is not a necessary party in the eviction petition and that his claim of ownership is irrelevant and impermissible in the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – The court dismisses the petition and upholds the order of the Rent Controller, holding that the petitioner cannot intervene in the eviction petition as a third person claiming ownership of the suit property and that his remedy lies elsewhere – The court relies on the settled law that one of the coowners or joint tenants can file or contest an eviction petition on behalf of the others and that the decision will be binding on all of them.

Relevant Paras:

16. The petitioner is yet to establish his status in the suit property as an owner, however, the petitioner is seeking impleadment into the eviction petition on the ground of being an LR of Sh. Madan Lal Gulati. The learned Trial Court has correctly considered that the petitioner is a joint tenant in the suit property. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to be impleaded as a defendant in an eviction petition as it is not necessary for all the tenants who are joint tenants to be arrayed as defendants in the eviction petition. The
petition filed by respondent no. 1 against respondent no. 2 is on the averments that they are in landlord-tenant relationship, therefore, the claim of the petitioner is impermissible in these circumstances as same cannot be adjudicated upon the present eviction petition.
17. Similar issue arose before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Anr. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla. (Dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 178 it has been held as under :-
“6……. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a
suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners…”

18. The above mentioned principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in FGP Ltd. vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and Anr. 2009(10) SCC 223.
19. In due consideration of the above laid principle of law, the petitioner cannot be permitted to be impleaded as a party in the present eviction petition as he is trying to set up a case adverse to that of respondent no. 1 which will render his eviction petition infructuous. It is needless to say that remedy of the petitioner lies elsewhere and the petitioner can bring his own suit seeking declaration of his ownership title.
20. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the order passed by learned ARC, consequently, the petition along with pending applications is dismissed leaving open the remedies of the petitioner against his brother.

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SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMAD THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT

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Parambir Singh vs State of Punjab CRMM 45865/23 19/09/23 [ RAJBIR SEHRAWAT JUSTICE ] [ PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT ]

Section 439 CRPC Arms Act, Section 25 Indian Penal Code, Sections 379B and 34 Regular Bail Snatching of car with others Petitioner contends that the recovery of illegal arms and ammunition from their house is a planted evidence due to police animosity Held,

except for the recovery of the car outside the petitioner’s house and the presence of the person who snatched it along with some arms and ammunition recovered from the petitioner’s house, there is no direct allegation against the petitioner in the incident of snatching Petitioner has been in custody since July 17, 2023 – Bail granted.

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CRM-M_45865_2023_19_09_2023_FINAL_ORDER Parambir Singh vs State

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[ JHARKHAND HIGH COURT ]

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA (DB)

Sheikh Hesamuddin @ Kabir, s/o Sheikh Kutubuddin  vs State of Jharkhand CRLDB 1212/18 20/03/23

Section 302 IPC Arms Act, Section 27 Murder Appeal against conviction Prosecution relied on the confessional statement, eyewitness accounts, and a Test Identification Parade TIP for evidence Medical evidence clearly supports the prosecution story that Indrapal Singh suffered firearm injuries TIP conducted about two months after the occurrence was delayed, and the eyewitness accounts were unreliable Deceased died a homicidal death caused by firearm injuries is corroborated by the medical evidence Presence of appellant at place of occurrence is a highly incriminatory material Prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt Conviction set aside. [Paras 12, 18, 21, 22 and 23]

Relevant Paras:

12. PW2 and PW3 both have identified the appellant also in the dock and this piece of evidence has remained intact. No doubt identification of an unknown assailant for the first time in the Court is a weak piece of evidence but then if the evidence of dock identification is clear and does not admit any doubt the same is sufficient for recording conviction of the accused. In “Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)” (2010) 6 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the dock identification of an accused even though for the first time in the Court is above board the same can form the basis for conviction of the accused. The dock identification of the appellant is corroborated by his identification by PW2 and PW3 in the TIP. On 25th February 2010 when the appellant was put on the TIP, he was not known to PW2 and this is not a defence set-up by the appellant that he was known to PW2 who at the instance of the police or the informant has falsely identified him as the shooter. According to the prosecution, PW2 was present at the place of occurrence when the appellant fired at Indrapal Singh. The defence has challenged presence of PW2 at the place of occurrence and labelled him as a chance witness. But there is no law of universal application that the evidence of a chance witness cannot be accepted to record conviction of the accused. Moreover, there is another eyewitness PW3 who has come to the Court to identify the appellant as the shooter. The evidence of PW3 has been criticized on the ground that he is a police witness. However, this is not a proposition in law that the evidence of a police witness should be viewed with doubt and suspicion. Merely because a witness happens to be the police or official witness, the Court need not start with initial distrust and is required to accept his evidence tendered in the Court as truthful. The evidence of a police or official witness is also tested on the same yardstick as the evidence of any other witness and if it inspires confidence of the Court that must be accepted and can form the basis for conviction of the accused. In “State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil” (2001) 1 SCC 652 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officers should be approached with initial distrust.

18. PW1 Kamaljeet Singh who is the informant of this case has affirmed in the Court that his fardbeyan was recorded on 5th January 2010 at around 8:00 PM at TMH. He has stated in the Court that he saw the dead body of his brother drenched in blood lying in his car. He has further stated that the people from the locality who were present at the place of occurrence informed him that two assailants came on a motorcycle and fired shots at his brother. In a lengthy cross-examination, the defence has elicited from him that he does not know the persons who informed him that two motorcycle- borne assailants came and fired shot at his brother. However, he has denied the defence suggestion that it was some other person with whom he has enmity regarding brick-kiln who has murdered his brother. PW2 Jagannath Jamuda has stated in the Court that on the date of occurrence while returning from General Store near Road No. 15 he saw two assailants firing at a person who was driving the car. He has identified Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court as the person with long hairs who fired shots at the deceased. That description of the appellant given by PW2 in the Court is not challenged by the appellant. He has identified him also in the TIP conducted at Ghaghidih Central Jail, but in his cross-examination he has stated that he went to the jail with the police officer to identify the accused. He has also stated that before the TIP the same police officer brought him to the Court Hazat. He has further stated that the assailants came on a motorcycle, but he could not remember registration number of that motorcycle. PW3 Jag Narayan Sharma who is a constable has stated that on 5th January 2010 on direction of the Officer-in-Charge of Mango PS he was in search of the accused and, at about 5:45 PM, near Forest Nursery he saw that two persons on a motorcycle were trying to overtake a car. The person sitting on the back seat of the motorcycle fired shots at the car driver three times and after that they fled away towards Chepa Bridge. He has identified Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court by his face but he could not tell his name in the Court. In his cross-examination, he has stated that at the time of occurrence he was in search of the accused Gabbar Singh and, that, there was sufficient light on road. He has also denied the suggestion that it was dark at the place of occurrence. In response to a defence suggestion, he has stated that he did not see the accused Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court Hazat after the occurrence.

21. The autopsy over the dead body of Indrapal Singh was conducted by a medical team constituting PW6, PW7 and PW11. There were as many as 3 firearm injuries caused to Indrapal Singh. The medical evidence clearly supports the prosecution story that Indrapal Singh suffered firearm injuries in the evening of 5th January 2010, at about 6:00 PM.

23. No doubt wherever it appears to the Court that two views are possible the view which favours the accused should be adopted by the Court. However, this is also a well-settled proposition in law that the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court which has the opportunity to observe the witnesses very closely must be given precedence and on minor inconsistencies the judgment of the trial Court can not be interfered by the appellate Court. In our opinion, PW2 and PW3 have remained unshaken in the Court and they did not waver from their previous statements made before the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution has produced corroborative evidence through PW4 who is a witness of seizure of two empty cartridges and two pellets from the place of occurrence. PW5 who is the owner of Mahesh General Store at Road No.15 was in his shop in the evening of 5th January 2010 when he heard sounds of firing coming from a distance of 200-250 yards. This witness was declared hostile on a prayer made by the prosecution but from his evidence the prosecution story that in the evening of 5th January 2010 Indrapal Singh was fired upon near Road No.15 is corroborated. PW13 who was posted as In-Charge of Technical Cell at Jamshedpur has affirmed in the Court that the Investigating Officer of this case had filed requisition for CDRs and location of the mobile phones of the criminals which were obtained from the service providers for the mobile numbers 9122909541, 9709219196 and 9534210584. During the trial, there was no serious challenge by the appellant that none of the aforementioned mobile numbers was carried by him on the date of occurrence. The CDRs and location of those mobile numbers established presence of the appellant and other two accused persons near Mango and the adjacent places. This scientific evidence produced by the prosecution to establish presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence is a highly incriminating material which may not be of much help to prove the charge of the murder against the appellant but this evidence cannot be brushed aside on mere technical objections raised on behalf of the appellant.

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Sheikh Hesamuddin @ Kabir, s:o Sheikh Kutubuddin vs state of Jharkhand judgment High court the law literates

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