Amendment of written statement – Allowed CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
[DEBOBRATA MONDAL VERSUS PIJUSH BANERJEE ] JUSTICE BISWAROOP CHOWDARY
*Section 151 and Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and Order 6, Rule 17 CPC Amendment of written statement Suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed – Defendants filed an application to amend their written statement, which was rejected by the court – In original WS, defendants made mistake in stating that ‘who was benamder’ which they sought to be corrected by amendment – Contention is that proposed amendment was necessary to rectify an inadvertent admission made in the written statement regarding Anita Devi’s status as the benamdar of Suprova Banerjee – While admissions should not be allowed to be withdrawn casually, courts have discretion to permit amendments if the admission was made inadvertently and the party seeking amendment acted in good faith – Thus, Courts had gone wrong in holding that defendant were not allowed to take inconsistent pleas in their defence – If a mistake in pleadings is committed due to inadvertence, opportunity should be given to rectify same – Amendment would not cause serious prejudice to plaintiffs – Amendment allowed.
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Debobrata Mondal & Ors. Vs. Pijush Banerjee and Ors. Judgment The Law Literates🔁
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Set-Aside / Section 482 CRPC Section 408 IPC Dismissal of application for getting statement recorded by way of video conferencing through server room at the Civil Court and closing of evidence of prosecution by court order – Challenged

Sukhmanjit Singh Dhindsa vs State of Punjab CRMM 59290/23 28/11/23 [ HARPREET JJ ] [ PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT ]
Section 482 CRPC Section 408 IPC Dismissal of application for getting statement recorded by way of video conferencing through server room at the Civil Court and closing of evidence of prosecution by court order – Challenged – Held, existing provisions of Criminal Procedure Code permit recording of evidence by way of video conferencing and such procedure duly recognized by High Court by inserting Model Video Conferencing Rules as circulated by Hon’ble Supreme Court – Recourse to record evidence through video conferencing is all more necessary when attendance of witness cannot be procured physically and any delay would affect progress of trial, which would cause great hardship and inconvenience to witness by travelling long distance to depose – Evidence of petitioner being complainant is necessary for pursuits of justice and mechanism of fair trial as enshrined under Article 21 of Constitution of India is not only available to accused but it exists for complainant victim as well and depriving opportunity to petitioner to depose through video conferencing, who is stuck in Canada due to diplomatic standoff between India and Canada, would be violative of his right to free and fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution – Therefore, dismissal of application for getting statement recorded by way of video conferencing set aside.
8. As such, keeping in view the proposition that the existing provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code permit recording of evidence by way of video conferencing and such procedure has been duly recognized by this Court by inserting Model Video Conferencing Rules as circulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The recourse to record evidence through video conferencing is all the more necessary when attendance of a witness cannot be procured physically and any delay would affect the progress of the trial, which would cause great hardship and inconvenience to the witness by travelling a long distance to depose. The evidence of the petitioner being complainant is necessary for the pursuits of justice and the mechanism of fair trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not only available to the accused but it exists for the complainant victim as well and depriving an opportunity to the petitioner to depose through video conferencing, who is stuck in Canada due to a diplomatic standoff between India and Canada, would be violative of his right to free and fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
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Sukhmanjit Singh Dhindsa State of Punjab and others The Law Literates Judgment 🔁
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Order 39 Rule 1 CPC Injunction Agreement to Sell Suit for Cancellation of an agreement and Injunction -Allowed

MONICA GOGIA VERSUS M S RSS ESTATE LLP & ORS 202/24 09/03/24 [ HON’BLE NEENA KRISHNA BANSAL JUSTICE ] [ DELHI HIGH COURT ]
• Order 39 Rule 1 CPC Injunction Agreement to Sell Suit for Cancellation of an agreement and Injunction – The plaintiff has filed a suit seeking to cancel an agreement to sell and a sale deed related to agricultural land in Mehrauli, New Delhi, and to prevent the defendants from alienating or constructing on the property – Alleged Fraud by Defendants – The plaintiff claims that the defendants failed to pay the balance consideration for the land and fraudulently obtained her signature on a Sale Deed without payment, leading to unauthorized construction and blocking access to her property – Court’s Interim Orders – The High Court has ordered a status quo on the title and possession of the property, directed the removal of any obstruction to the plaintiff’s access, and appointed a Local Commissioner to inspect the site and report on the construction and possession Status.
3. The present Suit for Cancellation and Permanent Injunction has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff seeking following reliefs: –
“a. Pass a decree in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants thereby cancelling the Agreement to Sell dated 22.01.2024 with respect to the Agricultural Land measuring 4 bighas i.e 4032 sq. yds, bearing Mustatil No. 33, Killa No. 17 min(4 – 0) situated in the revenue estate of Village Mehrauli,Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi;
b. Pass a decree in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants thereby cancelling the purported Sale Deed executed for the Agricultural Land measuring 4 bighas i.e 4032 sq. yds, bearing Mustatil No. 33, Killa No. 17 min(4 – 0) situated in the revenue estate of Village Mehrauli, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi;
c. Pass a Decree of Permanent Injunction in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their agents, attorneys, assignees from alienating, disposing, selling off or part with possession of Suit Property;
d. Pass a Decree of Permanent Injunction in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their agents, attorneys, assignees from entering into of Suit Property;
e. Pass a Decree awarding costs of the instant suit along with legal costs in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants.” Allowed
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MONICA GOGIA VERSUS M S RSS ESTATE LLP & ORS THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT
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Sectiona 499 IPC Defamation – Whether ‘retweeting’ a defamatory content amounts to ‘publication’ under Section 499 of IPC, and whether the petitioner, who is not the original author of the content, can be summoned for defamation -Dismissed

DELHI HIGH COURT
ARVIND KEJRIWAL 🆚 STATE AND ANR CRLMC 6343/19 Justice Swarna Kant Sharma
Sectiona 499 IPC Defamation – Whether ‘retweeting’ a defamatory content amounts to ‘publication’ under Section 499 of IPC, and whether the petitioner, who is not the original author of the content, can be summoned for defamation – The petitioner, who is the Chief Minister of Delhi, had retweeted a video posted by another person on YouTube, which allegedly contained defamatory statements against the respondent, who is the founder of a social media page supporting the Prime Minister of India – The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for defamation under Section 499/500 of IPC – The petitioner challenged the summoning order on the grounds that the retweet did not constitute defamation, as it did not have any intention or knowledge to harm the respondent’s reputation, and that the petitioner was not the original author or publisher of the content – The petitioner also argued that the respondent had earlier withdrawn a Similar complaint against him, which amounted to acquittal under Section 257 of Cr.P.C – The respondent contended that the retweet was defamatory, as it lowered his reputation in the eyes of the public, and that the petitioner had a large following on Twitter, which amplified the impact of the retweet – The respondent also argued that the earlier withdrawal of the complaint was due to the lack of jurisdiction of the court, and that it did not bar the subsequent prosecution of the petitioner – The reach and influence of the person retweeting the defamatory content, and the potential harm caused to the reputation of the aggrieved person, and holds that the petitioner, being a Chief Minister with a large social media following, cannot escape liability by merely contending that he had no malicious intent or knowledge of the defamatory content – It is difficult to erase the reputational injury from public memory, as the tweets may be deleted but perceptions are difficult to be deleted from the minds of the community – This Court, thus, for the purpose of adjudicating the present case, holds that retweeting a content, which is allegedly defamatory, on the Twitter account and projecting it to be as if his own views, will prima facie attract the liability under Section 499 of IPC, for the purpose of issuance of summons – Therefore, this Court finds no infirmity with the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court as well as learned Sessions Court – Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed – It is, however, clarified that the observations made hereinabove qua the present complaint case are solely for the purpose of deciding the instant petition challenging the summoning orders, and the same shall not be construed as opinion of this Court on the merits of the case, which will be adjudicated upon during the course of trial.
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ARVIND KEJRIWAL VERSUS STATE & ANR THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT
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Prevention of Money Laundering Act,- Sections 44 read with Section 45 – Bail application – Bail Application filed by Applicant, an MLA from Okhla constituency in Delhi, against the Enforcement Directorate (ED)- Appeal Dismissed

AMANATULLAH KHAN VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT BA 795/24 11/03/24 [ SWARANA KANTA SHARMA JUSTICE ] [ DELHI HIGH COURT ]
Prevention of Money Laundering Act,- Sections 44 read with Section 45 – Bail application – Bail Application filed by Applicant, an MLA from Okhla constituency in Delhi, against the Enforcement Directorate (ED) – The ED alleges that Applicant laundered money obtained through illegal gratification while he was the Chairman of the Delhi Waqf Board (DWB) — Applicant denies the allegations – The ED alleges that Applicant accumulated proceeds of crime by giving favors to bidders for leasing out Waqf properties, giving out jobs illegally, and misappropriating DWB funds – Applicant allegedly laundered this money by using it to purchase properties in the names of others –

Applicant argues that the predicate offences for which he is accused of money laundering are the same ones for which he has already been granted bail – He also argues that the ED has not shown that any crime actually occurred – The material brought before this Court at this stage is sufficient to attract bar under Section 45 of PMLA, and it prima facie shows the offence of money laundering being committed by the present accused/applicant – Further, the applicant despite being summoned on six occasions till date, has not joined investigation and cooperated with the investigating agency – Though a list of documents was also supplied by the agency to the applicant, as an Annexure to the summons, the applicant has failed to submit those documents with the investigating agency – Thus, considering the facts and circumstances, this Court does not find it a fit case for grant of pre-arrest bail to the present applicant — Appeal Dismissed
Relevant paras
EROSION OF TRUST: THE FALLOUT OF OBSTRUCTING
JUSTICE
81. In this Court’s opinion, repeated disobedience of summons of the investigating agency is equivalent to Obstruction of investigation – Obstruction of investigation is equivalent to obstruction of administration of justice – Obstruction of administration of justice is equivalent to Eroding trust and confidence in the criminal justice system – and eroding trust and confidence in the criminal justice system will lead to Anarchy and diminished respect for the rule of law.
82. Obstructing justice by not joining investigation is a hindrance in pursuit of justice. It is the right of an investigating agency and the State to pursue vigorously an investigation to the best of their ability,
and further to conduct investigation fairly, independently, and objectively without any ill-will or enmity towards either the accused or the victim. Obstructing administration of justice, thus, thwarts
the lawful authority of an investigating agency and hampers the legitimate investigative process.
83. The law is enacted to serve public interest by promoting accountability of a citizen to the law and in case of accountability of a public servant to the community at large and to the State. The negatively impacting facts on the community at large by holding
such conduct to be legitimate despite disobedience of repeated summons by an investigating agency will send a message to public that non-compliance of repeated summons i.e. almost six
summons without a valid excuse would not invite ire of law. It will also compromise future investigations by the same agencies as the public opinion and message will be formed that, if any person skips
multiple summons of any investigating agency including ED, neither the investigating agency nor the Court of law are able to bring such persons to obey the mandate of law and such a person can be enlarged on anticipatory bail. Conversely, a message may be taken
by the public that such avoidance of multiple summons and non- joining of investigation by any investigating agency is permissible in law.
84. When a person does not join investigation upon receipt of summons of investigating agency which have not been declared illegal or struck down by a Court of law, it means that he has acted in a way so as to prevent the Law Enforcement Agency from collecting information about a suspected offence. Such an attempt and conduct of a person results in delaying the administration of justice, since it
delays investigation of a suspected offence. Refusing to assist, aid, provide relevant information asked for by the Law Enforcement Agency when lawfully asked, failing to appear before the investigating agency, despite being bound in law, such non- appearance thus, amounts to obstructing the Law Enforcement
Agency and the concerned officers from performing their duties to investigate the case which is equivalent to obstructing administration of justice and investigation.
85. In the background of a decision that a Court of lawreaches, lies the public interest analysis, as a Court of law is aware regarding possible impact of its decision and the alleged conduct of the accused in relation to an alleged offence and his reluctance to join investigation on the community at large.
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AMANATULLAH KHAN versus DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT The Law Literates
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Consumer Law Defective Vehicle The petitioner challenges the order of the State Commission, Kerala, which upheld the order of the District Forum, Palakkad, in favor of the respondent

Force Motors Limited vs Ravindran RP 3067/16 29/02/24 [ INDER JJ ]
[ NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI]
Consumer Law Defective Vehicle The petitioner challenges the order of the State Commission, Kerala, which upheld the order of the District Forum, Palakkad, in favor of the respondent a consumer who purchased a defective autorickshaw from the petitioner The respondent alleges that the auto-rickshaw failed to deliver the promised mileage of 35 km per litre, had excessive fuel consumption and engine issues, and became unserviceable during the warranty period, despite repeated attempts to rectify the defects by the dealer and the manufacturer The respondent seeks a refund of the price of the auto-rickshaw, Rs. 1,68,000/-, along with compensation for financial losses and mental distress caused by the defective vehicle – Both the District Forum and the State Commission find that the respondent is a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and that the petitioner is liable for deficiency in service and unfair trade practices – They rely on the inspection report of an expert commissioner, who identified manufacturing defects in the vehicle, and order the petitioner to pay Rs. 84,000/to the respondent as the price of the vehicle and Rs. 3,000/towards costs.
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Force_Motors_Limited_vs_Ravindran_Anr_on_29_February_2024 the law literates
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Order VIII Rule 1 CPC Written Statement – The petitioner filed a written statement in response to a suit filed by the respondent The petitioner claims that the trial court wrongly rejected the written statement –

[HIGH COURT OF DELHI ]
NITIN KATARIA VERSUS VARUN JAIN
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR
Order VIII Rule 1 CPC Written Statement – The petitioner filed a written statement in response to a suit filed by the respondent The petitioner claims that the trial court wrongly rejected the written statement – The trial court rejected the written statement because it was filed late and not accompanied by the required documents – The petitioner argues that they were misled by a wrong order uploaded by the court – The court found that the petitioner did not file an application to condone the delay or explain the missing documents – The court also found that the petitioner’s lawyer was present in court when the order rejecting the written statement was issued – In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not have a good reason for not filing the written statement on time*_
Relevant Paras
Analysis & Conclusion
16. Submissions heard, record perused along with the impugned order. It is relevant to note the provision under the Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides for 30 days from the date of service of summons as the time within which written statement may be filed in response to the suit. The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 as substituted by the Commercial Courts Act reads as under:
“1. Written Statement.—The Defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.”
17. It is also pertinent to note that a new proviso was substituted to Order VIII Rule l of the CPC which reads as follows:
“Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which
shall not be later than one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.”

18. From the reading of the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that while the normal period for filing the written statement in response to a suit would expire 30 days from the date of service of the summons, the written statement may be filed within a further period of 90 days subject to the reasons to be recorded in writing by the Court. Necessarily, the reasons
explained by the defendant by seeking condonation of delay should be such that the Court is satisfied that there is a sufficient reason with the defendant
for not filing the written statement within 30 days. However, in commercial suits, no power vests in the Court to condone the delay beyond 120 days.
19. It is also well settled that the courts are bound to follow the timeframe defined for the purpose of limitation which is not subjected to any exception. The courts cannot extend in any manner the time frame no matter whether there is genuineness in the reasons for such a delay. To curb the prolonged delays in the lis, comprehensive amendments were
introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in view of long periods being taken up for completion of pleadings in a case, such as by modifying the maximum period for filing the written statement to 120 days.
20. In the present case, the written statement though filed belatedly by the petitioner on 18.07.2022, however the other relevant documents i.e. statement of truth and admission/denial were not filed along with it. Order VI Rule 15(A) of the CPC as amended under Commercial Courts Act requires that pleadings are to be supported by a duly attested affidavit by
way of verification failing which the said pleadings shall not be permitted to be read as evidence of any fact set out in the petition.
21. Evidently, the affidavit by way of statement of truth is required to be filed along with the petition and the written statement as per the mandate of
the Act.
22. It is relevant to note the Order VI Rule 15A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:

―[15A. Verification of pleadings in a commercial dispute.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 15, every pleading in a commercial dispute shall be verified by an affidavit in the manner and form prescribed in the Appendix to this Schedule.
(2) An affidavit under sub-rule (1) above shall be signed by the party or by one of the parties to the proceedings, or by any other person on behalf of such party or parties who is proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts
of the case and who is duly authorised by such party or parties.
(3) Where a pleading is amended, the amendments must be verified in the form and manner referred to in sub-rule (1) unless the Court orders otherwise.
(4) Where a pleading is not verified in the manner provided under sub-rule (1), the party shall not be permitted to rely on such pleading as evidence or any of the matters set out therein.
(5) The Court may strike out a pleading which is not verified by a Statement of Truth, namely, the affidavit set out in the Appendix to this Schedule.]‖
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Hindu Marriage Can’t Be Dissolved By Unilateral Declaration Executed On A Stamp Paper: Allahabad High Court

Vinod-Kumar-sant-ram-vs-shiv-rani-2024-[Allahabad-High-Court]
Hindu Marriage Can’t Be Dissolved By Unilateral Declaration Executed On A Stamp Paper: Allahabad High Court
6. A marriage between two Hindus can be dissolved only by modes recognized by the Hindu Marriage Act and unilateral declaration executed on a stamp paper worth Rs. 10/- is not a mode of dissolution by Hindu Marriage recognized by law. Therefore, the marriage between the parties was not dissolved in accordance with law and she continues to be legally wedded wife of the revisionist.
7. The Family Court has also recorded that the revisionist stated in his cross examination that he got married to one Sunita in his childhood. Some litigation took place between the revisionist and his first wife Sunita, which was closed in the year 2002. Thereafter the revisionist married the opposite party and got separated from her in the year 2005. In the year 2008, he married yet another lady Bina Pathak.
8. The Family Court has observed that the revisionist has not given any particulars of the litigation that took place between him and his first wife Sunita and no document relating to that litigation was brought on record by the revisionist.
9. Regarding the plea of delay of 14 years in filing the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Family Court held that Section 125 Cr.P.C.does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing the application. The Family Court took into
consideration the statement of the opposite party that earlier she had filed an application for maintenance in the year 2011 but her brother died after some time and she was very sad, for this reason, she could not pursue the case. Thereafter, she filed the application in question.
10. The family Court concluded that without dissolution of marriage with the opposite party, the revisionist has married another lady Bina Pathak and three sons have borne out of the wedlock between the revisionist and Bina pathak and this gives rise to a sufficient cause for the opposite party to live separate from the revisionist.
11. There appears to be no error or illegality in the aforesaid findings of the family court.
12. Regarding quantum of maintenance, the Family Court noted the statement of the revisionist that he works as a priest. DW-2 Munna Lal alias Radhika Nandan stated that the applicant is M.A. in Sanskrit and he preaches Bhagwat Katha and performs other religious rituals as a priest.
13. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, the Family Court directed the revisionist to pay Rs. 2200/- per month as maintenance to his wife-respondent.
14. The Family Court has passed the impugned order after taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, as noted above and there is no error or illegality in any finding of the Family Court. The revisionist relied upon a decision of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Amit Kumar Kachhap v. Sangeeta Toppo, Criminal Revision No. 512 of 2023 decided on 02.02.2024 wherein the Jharkhand High Court held that where the respondent had been residing aloof from the husband without any reasonable cause, the wife was not entitled to claim maintenance.
Digitally signed by :-
PRADEEP SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
15. There can be no dispute against the aforesaid proposition of law and it is in accordance with the statutory mandate contained under Section 125 (4) Cr.P.C. but when the marriage between the revisionist and the opposite party has not been dissolved by any manner known to law, it continues to subsist and the respondent having married another lady and having procreated three children from her, has given rise to a reasonable cause to the opposite party to live separate from the revisionist.
16. Even otherwise the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. can be filed by the applicant even after dissolution of her marriage as has been held by the Hob’ble Supreme Court in Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, (2020) 19 SCC 342.
17. In these circumstances, the finding of the Family Court that the opposite party is living away from the revisionist because of sufficient cause, is absolutely correct and the judgment cannot be said to be vitiated on any score.
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vinod-kumar-sant-ram-vs-shiv-rani-2024-allahabad-high-court-The-Law-literates
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📢 Job Opportunity: Associate at The Chamber of AOR Manish Kumar

📢 Job Opportunity: Associate at The Chamber of AOR Manish Kumar
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