Blog - Page 14 of 31 - The Law Literates

12Mar, 2024

Acquittal:- Section 306 IPC Abetment of suicide Accused persons, husband and inlaws allegedly harassing victim, resulting in victim committing suicide by hanging Conviction of accused Appeal against conviction

[ CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT ]

Chhannu vs State of MP CRA 2537/99 06/11/17

• Section 306 IPC Abetment of suicide Accused persons, husband and inlaws allegedly harassing victim, resulting in victim committing suicide by hanging Conviction of accused Appeal against conviction – It is clear from the admission of mother of the deceased that the deceased never complained of any assault on her before her death Deceased had complained of assault on her during her last visit to her maternal house before her death, but no report had been lodged in this regard nor any panchayat meeting was called – From the evidence on record, it appears that no grievous issue was involved between the deceased and her in-laws which could abet her to commit suicide – Merely because the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house, her in-laws and husband cannot be charged for harassment and abetment to commit suicide – Though the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house yet there is no conclusive evidence against her inlaws and husband, i.e., the appellants to hold them guilty – Consequently, present appeal is allowed – Accused acquitted of charges.

Relevant Paras

15. Baliram (PW7), brother-in-law (Jija) of the deceased has stated that once he had gone to the matrimonial house of the deceased. At that time, the Appellants had not talked to him, therefore, he had returned therefrom. At that time, the deceased had told him that whenever any of her relatives visits there, they do not talk to the relative. She had also told him that after returning of the relative, they beat her. In paragraph 6 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that this incident took place before 2 years of the death of the deceased. He further admitted that during those 2 years, he never listened about any beating given to the deceased by her in- laws. From the above also, the prosecution case does not find support.
16. Chintaram (PW3) has admitted that Jamunbai was suffering from head ache and due to which she was disturbed. Budhiyarinbai (PW4) has also admitted that Jamunbai was suffering from head ache and that was being got treated by her in-laws.
17. From the above discussion, it is clear that though deceased Jamunbai committed suicide in her matrimonial house yet from the evidence on record it is clear that the deceased used to visit her maternal house on every occasions of Tija festival and return thereafter to her matrimonial house. Her maternal relatives also used to visit her at her matrimonial house. According to Budhiyarinbai (PW4), mother of the deceased, the deceased happily came to her maternal house on every occasions of Tija festival and she never refused to return to her matrimonial house. It is also clear from the admission of the mother of the deceased that the deceased never complained of any assault on her before her death. The deceased had complained of assault on her during her last visit to her maternal house before her death, but no report had been lodged in this regard nor any panchayat meeting was called. From the evidence on record, it appears that no grievous issue was involved between the deceased and her in-laws which could abet her to commit suicide. Merely because the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house, her in-laws and husband cannot be charged for harassment and abetment to commit suicide. Though the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house yet there is no conclusive evidence against her in-laws and husband, i.e., the Appellants to hold them guilty.
18. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The Appellants are acquitted of the charge framed against them.

To read the judgment click here

Chhannu & Ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) judgment High Court

9Mar, 2024

MP high court set aside ex parte divorce decree on the ground that the the lady could not suffer due to mistake of her counsel

[ MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT ](1) FA No. 217 of 2015
Smt. Pushpa Devi vs. Santoshi Lal Sharma

Order 9, Rule 13 CPC Divorce petition Setting aside of ex parte decree Appellant had engaged as her lawyer for prosecuting her case in the divorce petition filed by her husband/respondent, who had assured her not to come to the Court on each date of hearing and he will call her as and when required – In the present matter, the appellant is 57 years old lady and could not be made to suffer on the fault of her counsel – She has given sufficient cause/reason for nonappearance of her/her counsel before the Court concerned whereby an ex parte judgment and decree has been passed against her – Appeal Allowed.

To read the judgment click here

FA_217_2015_FinalOrder_16-Sep-2021 Smt. Pushpa Devi vs. Santoshi Lal Sharma

6Mar, 2024

Defamation Suit – Filed against Senior Advocate Vikas Pahwa dismissed by Delhi High court on the ground that the language used in the judicial proceedings cannot be said to be defamation and comes under previleged communication.

PANKAJ OSWAL VERSUS VIKAS PAHWA

[ DELHI HIGH COURT ]

CORAM: R.F.A. (O.S.) 14 OF 2023
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

Defamation suit filed against senior Advocate Vikas Pahwa dismissed by Delhi High court on the ground that the language used in the judicial proceedings cannot be said to be defamation and comes under previleged communication.

Defamation Suit – Defamation suit filed by Pankaj Oswal against Vikas Pahwa, a senior advocate who represented Oswal’s mother in a criminal case Whether the statement made by Pahwa in the court that Oswal had used unparliamentary language and abused his mother during mediation proceedings was protected by absolute privilege and did not constitute a cause of action for defamation – The court held that the statement was protected by absolute privilege as it was made in the course of judicial proceedings and had reference to the subject matter of the proceedings – The court dismissed the appeal filed by Oswal against the rejection of his plaint by the single judge – The court reasoned that the doctrine of absolute privilege was based on public interest and common convenience and aimed to ensure the free and _ fearless administration of justice – The court also observed that the statement was made in response to the suggestion of the sessions judge to explore the possibility of amicable settlement through mediation – The court rejected the argument that the statement had no relevance to the proceedings or that it violated Oswal’s fundamental right to reputation under Article 21 of the Constitution.

TO READ THE JUDGMENT CLICK HERE

PANKAJ OSWAL VERSUS VIKAS PAHWA DELHI HIGH COURT JUDGMENT

2Mar, 2024

Stages of Civil Suit By The Law Literates

Stages of Civil suit

*CPC*

*Order 1 : PARTIES TO SUITS*

*(Rule 1)* Who may be joined as plaintiffs.
*(Rule 3)* Who may be joined as defendants.
*(Rule 9)* Mis-joinder and non-joinder.
*(Rule 10)* Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.
*(Rule 13)* Objections as to non-joinder or mis-joinder.

Order 2– FRAME OF SUIT

*(Rule 1)* Frame of suit.
*(Rule 3)* Joinder of causes of action.
*(Rule 7)* Objections as to mis-joinder.

*(Order 4) INSTITUTION OF SUITS*

*(Rule 1)* Suit to be commenced by plaint.
*(Rule 2)* Register of suits.

*(Order 5) ISSUE AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS*

*(Rule 1)* Summons.
*(Rule 3)* Court may order defendant or plaintiff to appear in person.
*(Rule 9)* Delivery or transmission of summons for service.
*(Rule 9A)* Summons given to the plaintiff for service.
*(Rule 15)* Where service may be on an adult member of defendant’s family.
*(Rule 17)* Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be found.
*(Rule 20)* Substituted service.
*(Rule 24)* Service on defendant in prison.
*(Rule 28)* Service on soldiers, sailors or airmen.
*(Rule 30)* Substitution of letter for summons.

*Order 6 – PLEADINGS GENERALLY*

*(Rule 1)* Pleading.
*(Rule 2)* Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.
*(Rule 3)* Forms of pleading.
*(Rule 16)* Striking out pleadings.
*(Rule 17)* Amendment of pleadings.
*(Rule 18)* Failure to amend after order.

*Order 7 – PLAINT*

*(Rule 1)* Particulars to be contained in plaint.
*(Rule 4)* When plaintiff sues as representative.
*(Rule 10)* Return of plaint.
*(Rule 11)* Rejection of plaint.
*(Rule 14)* Production of document on which plaintiff sues.

*Order 8 – WRITTEN STATEMENT, SET-OF AND COUNTER-CLAIM*

*(Rule 1*) Written statement.
*(Rule 1A)* Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him.
*(Rule 6)* Particulars of set-off to be given in written statement.
*(Rule 6A)* Counter-claim by defendant.
*(Rule 6B)* Counter-claim to be stated.

*Order 9- APPEARANCE OF PARTIES AND CONSEQUENCE OF NON-APPEARANCE*

*(Rule 1)* Parties to appear on day fixed in summons for defendant to appear and answer.
*(Rule 3)* Where neither party appears, suit to be dismissed.
*(Rule 5)* Dismissal of suit where plaintiff after summons returned unserved, fails for one month to apply for fresh summons.
*(Rule 6)* Procedure when only plaintiff appears.
*(Rule 8)* Procedure where defendant only appears.
*(Rule 13)* Setting aside decree ex-parte against defendant.
*(Rule 14)* No decree to be set aside without notice to opposite party.

*Order 10- EXAMINATION OF PARTIES BY THE COURT*

*(Rule 1)* Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.
*(Rule 1A)* Direction of the court to opt for any one mode of alternative dispute resolution.
*(Rule 3)* Substance of examination to be written.

*Order 14- SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES AND DETERMINATION OF SUIT ON ISSUES OF LAW OR ON ISSUES AGREED UPON*

*(Rule 1)* Framing of issues.
*(Rule 3)* Materials from which issues may be framed.
*(Rule 5)* Power to amend and strike out issues.

*Order 15- DISPOSAL OF THE SUIT AT THE FIRST HEARING*

*(Rule 1)* Parties not at issue.
*(Rule 2)* One of several defendants not at issue.
*(Rule 3)* Parties at issue.
*(Rule 4)* Failure to produce evidence.

*Order 16- SUMMONING AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES*

*(Rule 6)* Summons to produce document.
*(Rule 10)* Procedure whose witness fails to comply with summons.
*(Rule 12)* Procedure if witness fails to appear.

*Order 17- ADJOURNMENTS*

*(Rule 1)* Court may grant time and adjourn hearing.
*(Rule 2)* Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed.
*(Rule 3)* Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc.

*Order 20– JUDGMENT AND DECREE*

*(Rule 1)* Judgment when pronounced.
*(Rule 6)* Contents of decree.
*(Rule 6A)* Last paragraph of judgment to indicate in precise terms the reliefs granted.
(Rule 12)Decree for possession and mesne profits.

Order 20A- COSTS

(Rule 1) Provisions relating to certain items.
(Rule 2) Costs to be awarded in accordance with the rules made by High Court.

29Feb, 2024

The Delhi High Court has instructed all district judges to submit status reports regarding the display boards’ status in their respective district courts.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 2657/2024
MUKUL SHARMA ….. Petitioner Through: Petitioner in person
versus
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL
TERRITORY OF DELHI & ANR. ….. Respondents

The Delhi High Court has instructed all district judges to submit status reports regarding the display boards’ status in their respective district courts.

CORAM:
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

Relevant Paras

1. Present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner in person seeking a direction to the Respondents to make the display boards functional in the District Courts of Delhi.
2. Petitioner, who appears in person, states that non-functional display boards are causing inconvenience to lawyers, litigants and other Court officials in the District Court of Delhi.
3. Issue notice. Mr. Divyam Nandrajog, learned counsel for Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) and Mr. Ripu Daman Bhardwaj, learned counsel for Union of India (UOI) accept notice.

4. All the District Judges are directed to file status reports on the administrative side through the Registrar General of this Court indicating the status of display boards in their district Courts within four weeks. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the Registrar General for his information.
5. List on 16th April, 2024.

To read the order kindly click here

MUKUL SHARMA versus GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI & ANR. THE LAW LITERATES ORDER DELHI HIGH COURT

26Feb, 2024

Slapping a wife in a public setting does not constitute the offence of violating a woman’s modesty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code./J&K High Court

MEHBOOB ALI …PETITIONER(S) Vs.
NISAR FATIMA ….RESPONDENT(S)

CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE CRM(M) No.265/2022👨‍⚖️

Slapping a wife in a public setting does not constitute the offence of violating a woman’s modesty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code./J&K High Court

The petitioner, husband of the respondent, claims to have filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent/wife and the respondent/wife too has filed a suit for cancellation of the marriage
agreement executed between the parties. It is stated that while the above-mentioned litigations were pending between the parties, the respondent, at the behest of her family members, filed a false and
flimsy complaint before the learned trial court which referred the same to the concerned police for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C.
CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 2 of 4 After the report in terms of Section 202 of Cr. P. C was submitted by
the police, the learned trial court vide order dated 30.03.2022, issued process against the petitioner for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC.

7) The perusal of the complaint reveals that the respondent moved an application for initiation of criminal proceedings/lodging of FIR against the petitioner alleging therein that when she had come to the Court on 19.03.2022, the petitioner thrashed her, as a result of which she got injured and he also slapped the respondent in public gaze. The learned trial court recorded the statement of the respondent who was identified by her counsel and the trial court thereafter in its wisdom deem it proper to refer the complaint to SHO, P/S Pulwama for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C. The SHO, P/S Pulwama, submitted a report before the trial court and by placing reliance upon the said report, the trial court issued the process against the petitioner
for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC. As rightly conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, from the averments made in the complaint, no offence under Section 354 IPC is made out but offence under Section 323 IPC is made out as the respondent has categorically stated that she was thrashed and slapped in public gaze by the petitioner when she had come to attend the
proceedings.

8) The trial court record reveals that before the matter was referred for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C, the statement of the CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 4 of 4 complainant was recorded by the learned Magistrate, as such, there is no force in the contention raised by the petitioner.
9) For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that order dated 30.03.2022, so far as issuance of process for commission of offence under Section 354 IPC is concerned, the same
is not sustainable in the eyes of law and, accordingly, the same is quashed whereas the order impugned to the extent of issuance of process under Section 323 IPC is upheld. The petition is, accordingly,
disposed of. The interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. The trial court shall proceed ahead with the proceedings in accordance with law.

To read the judgment kindly click here

MEHBOOB ALI Vs. NISAR FATIMA JUDGMENT THE LAW LITERATES J &k HIGH COURT

24Feb, 2024

Complaint filed by the second wife against the husband for the offense under Section 498-A of the IPC was not maintainable Conviction set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 1372 OF 2019

KANTHARAJU VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA

• Sections 498A IPC Cruelty Complainant, who was the second wife of the petitioner, faced harassment and ill treatment from him, leading her to file a complaint Petitioner contended that since the complainant was the second wife, the basic ingredients of the provision did not apply Complainant in her evidence, being the mother of complainant both have consistently deposed and admitted that,she is the second wife of the petitioner Complaint filed by the second wife against the husband for the offense under Section 498-A of the IPC was not maintainable Conviction set aside.

Relevant Paras

9. On perusal of the above said provision, it shows that the husband or relative of a woman subjecting her to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment. It is needless to say that, “woman” in the said definition means and includes, legally wedded wife. As per the evidence of PWs.1 and 2, it is an admitted fact that, the complainant was the second wife of the petitioner.

10. The prosecution has to establish that, the marriage of PW.1 is legal or she is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner. Unless, it is established that, she is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner, the Courts below ought to have acted upon the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 that, PW.1 was the second wife. Once PW.1 is considered as second wife of the petitioner, obviously, the complaint filed against the petitioner for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC ought not to have been entertained. In other words, complaint filed by the second wife against the husband and her in-laws is not maintainable. The Courts below committed error in applying the principles and also the law on this aspect. Therefore, interference by this Court in exercising the Revisional jurisdiction is justified.
11. My view is fortified by the dictum Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases stated supra. Now, it is relevant to refer the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the second wife is permitted to lodge the complaint against the husband for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC.

13. Similarly, the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.Sivakumar, referred to supra, in para 7 of the said judgment, it reads thus:
“7. Undisputedly, the marriage between the appellant No.1 and PW-1 has been found to be null and void. As such the conviction under Section 498-A IPC would not be sustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in the case Shivcharan Lal Verma’s case supra. So far as the conviction under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the learned trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In an appeal/revision, the High Court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible.”
14. The ratio of these two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicates that, if the marriage between the husband and wife ended as null and void, the offence under Section 498-A of IPC cannot be sustained.
15. Admittedly, in the present case, the complainant in her evidence, PW.2 being the mother of PW.1 both have consistently deposed and admitted that, PW.1 is the second wife of the petitioner. Accordingly, the concurrent findings of the Courts below in recording the conviction requires to be set aside.

To read the Judgment click here

CRLRP1372-19-17-07-2023 KANTHARAJU VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA JUDGMENT THE LAW LITERATES

24Feb, 2024

The implementation of new criminal laws, supplanting colonial-era codes, is scheduled to commence on July 1st.

Big News : The implementation of new criminal laws, supplanting colonial-era codes, is scheduled to commence on July 1st.

Three fresh statutes on criminality, supplanting antiquated British legal codes, are set to take effect starting July 1st. These laws, approved during the Winter Session of Parliament and receiving the President’s assent, entail harsher penalties specifically aimed at acts of terrorism and lynching. They mark a significant departure from the colonial-era Indian Penal Code (IPC), Indian Evidence Act, and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), ushering in a new legal framework for the nation.

The trio of fresh criminal statutes comprises the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, heralding a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s criminal justice framework.

As per three identical notifications issued by the Union Home Ministry, the provisions outlined in the new legislation will be enforced starting July 1st.

Parliament passed The Bharatiya Sakshya Sanhita, 2023, The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Bill, 2023, and The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 on December 21 of the preceding year. These bills received Presidential assent from President Droupadi Murmu on December 25, subsequently replacing the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and the IPC.

However, despite assurances made to protesting truckers, the government has opted not to implement the provision pertaining to hit-and-run cases involving vehicle drivers.

One of the notifications stated, “In accordance with the authority vested by sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), the central government hereby designates the 1st day of July 2024 as the effective date for the enforcement of the provisions outlined in the aforementioned Sanhita, excluding the provision detailed in sub-section (2) of section 106.”

20Feb, 2024

Delhi Rent Control Act Section 14(1)(e) Eviction petition The petitioner challenges the order of the Rent Controller that dismissed his application to be impleaded as a party in an eviction petition filed by the respondent

SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMED & ANR.

CORAM: (Delhi High Court)
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR

Delhi Rent Control Act Section 14(1)(e) Eviction petition The petitioner challenges the order of the Rent Controller that dismissed his application to be impleaded as a party in an eviction petition filed by the respondent no.1, against the respondent no.2, who is the petitioner’s brother and one of the legal heirs of their deceased father – The petitioner claims to be the owner and exclusive possessor of the suit property, which is a shop and a workshop, by way of adverse possession of the evacuee property and relinquishment deeds executed by the other legal heirs of his father – He alleges that the respondent no.1 and 2 have colluded to create a false landlord-tenant relationship and seeks to join the eviction petition to protect his rights – The respondent no.1 contends that he is the landlord of the suit property and that ‘father of Petitioner’ was his tenant till his death, after which the tenancy devolved upon the respondent no.21. – He argues that the petitioner is not a necessary party in the eviction petition and that his claim of ownership is irrelevant and impermissible in the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – The court dismisses the petition and upholds the order of the Rent Controller, holding that the petitioner cannot intervene in the eviction petition as a third person claiming ownership of the suit property and that his remedy lies elsewhere – The court relies on the settled law that one of the coowners or joint tenants can file or contest an eviction petition on behalf of the others and that the decision will be binding on all of them.

Relevant Paras:

16. The petitioner is yet to establish his status in the suit property as an owner, however, the petitioner is seeking impleadment into the eviction petition on the ground of being an LR of Sh. Madan Lal Gulati. The learned Trial Court has correctly considered that the petitioner is a joint tenant in the suit property. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to be impleaded as a defendant in an eviction petition as it is not necessary for all the tenants who are joint tenants to be arrayed as defendants in the eviction petition. The
petition filed by respondent no. 1 against respondent no. 2 is on the averments that they are in landlord-tenant relationship, therefore, the claim of the petitioner is impermissible in these circumstances as same cannot be adjudicated upon the present eviction petition.
17. Similar issue arose before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Anr. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla. (Dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 178 it has been held as under :-
“6……. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a
suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners…”

18. The above mentioned principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in FGP Ltd. vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and Anr. 2009(10) SCC 223.
19. In due consideration of the above laid principle of law, the petitioner cannot be permitted to be impleaded as a party in the present eviction petition as he is trying to set up a case adverse to that of respondent no. 1 which will render his eviction petition infructuous. It is needless to say that remedy of the petitioner lies elsewhere and the petitioner can bring his own suit seeking declaration of his ownership title.
20. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the order passed by learned ARC, consequently, the petition along with pending applications is dismissed leaving open the remedies of the petitioner against his brother.

To read the judgment click here

SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMAD THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT

18Feb, 2024

Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra’s unanimous re-election as the Member Representative to the Bar Council of India from Bihar for a third consecutive term is a testament to his unwavering commitment, exceptional leadership, and profound expertise in legal matters

Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra’s unanimous re-election as the Member Representative to the Bar Council of India from Bihar for a third consecutive term is a testament to his unwavering commitment, exceptional leadership, and profound expertise in legal matters. Serving as a Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court, Mr. Mishra has consistently demonstrated his dedication to upholding the principles of justice and fairness.

The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh being presented a memento by the Chairman, Bar Council of India, Shri Manan Kumar Mishra at the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of Bar Council of India, in New Delhi on February 16, 2013..The Union Minister for Law & Justice, Dr. Ashwani Kumar and the Chief Justice of India, Shri Justice Altamas Kabir are also seen..

His dual role as the Chairman of the Bar Council of India underscores his significant influence and pivotal position within the legal community. Through his leadership, Mr. Mishra has worked tirelessly to address the challenges facing the legal profession, promote ethical standards, and safeguard the interests of legal practitioners.

Having represented Bihar for the past two terms, Mr. Mishra’s re-election highlights the widespread trust and confidence placed in his ability to effectively advocate for the state’s legal community. His wealth of experience, coupled with his proactive approach to addressing pertinent issues, makes him a formidable advocate for the advancement of legal rights and responsibilities.

Under Mr. Mishra’s stewardship, the Bar Council of India is poised to continue its vital role in shaping the legal landscape of the nation and upholding the rule of law. His re-election reaffirms his status as a distinguished legal luminary and a beacon of integrity within the legal fraternity.