MEHBOOB ALI …PETITIONER(S) Vs.
NISAR FATIMA ….RESPONDENT(S)

CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE CRM(M) No.265/2022👨‍⚖️ 

Slapping a wife in a public setting does not constitute the offence of violating a woman’s modesty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code./J&K High Court 

The petitioner, husband of the respondent, claims to have filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent/wife and the respondent/wife too has filed a suit for cancellation of the marriage
agreement executed between the parties. It is stated that while the above-mentioned litigations were pending between the parties, the respondent, at the behest of her family members, filed a false and
flimsy complaint before the learned trial court which referred the same to the concerned police for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C.
CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 2 of 4 After the report in terms of Section 202 of Cr. P. C was submitted by
the police, the learned trial court vide order dated 30.03.2022, issued process against the petitioner for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC.

7) The perusal of the complaint reveals that the respondent moved an application for initiation of criminal proceedings/lodging of FIR against the petitioner alleging therein that when she had come to the Court on 19.03.2022, the petitioner thrashed her, as a result of which she got injured and he also slapped the respondent in public gaze. The learned trial court recorded the statement of the respondent who was identified by her counsel and the trial court thereafter in its wisdom deem it proper to refer the complaint to SHO, P/S Pulwama for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C. The SHO, P/S Pulwama, submitted a report before the trial court and by placing reliance upon the said report, the trial court issued the process against the petitioner
for commission of offences under Section 323 and 354 IPC. As rightly conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, from the averments made in the complaint, no offence under Section 354 IPC is made out but offence under Section 323 IPC is made out as the respondent has categorically stated that she was thrashed and slapped in public gaze by the petitioner when she had come to attend the
proceedings.

8) The trial court record reveals that before the matter was referred for investigation under Section 202 of Cr. P. C, the statement of the CRM(M) No.265/2022 Page 4 of 4 complainant was recorded by the learned Magistrate, as such, there is no force in the contention raised by the petitioner.
9) For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that order dated 30.03.2022, so far as issuance of process for commission of offence under Section 354 IPC is concerned, the same
is not sustainable in the eyes of law and, accordingly, the same is quashed whereas the order impugned to the extent of issuance of process under Section 323 IPC is upheld. The petition is, accordingly,
disposed of. The interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. The trial court shall proceed ahead with the proceedings in accordance with law.

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MEHBOOB ALI Vs. NISAR FATIMA JUDGMENT THE LAW LITERATES J &k HIGH COURT

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SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMED & ANR. 

CORAM: (Delhi High Court)
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR

Delhi Rent Control Act Section 14(1)(e) Eviction petition The petitioner challenges the order of the Rent Controller that dismissed his application to be impleaded as a party in an eviction petition filed by the respondent no.1, against the respondent no.2, who is the petitioner’s brother and one of the legal heirs of their deceased father – The petitioner claims to be the owner and exclusive possessor of the suit property, which is a shop and a workshop, by way of adverse possession of the evacuee property and relinquishment deeds executed by the other legal heirs of his father – He alleges that the respondent no.1 and 2 have colluded to create a false landlord-tenant relationship and seeks to join the eviction petition to protect his rights – The respondent no.1 contends that he is the landlord of the suit property and that ‘father of Petitioner’ was his tenant till his death, after which the tenancy devolved upon the respondent no.21. – He argues that the petitioner is not a necessary party in the eviction petition and that his claim of ownership is irrelevant and impermissible in the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – The court dismisses the petition and upholds the order of the Rent Controller, holding that the petitioner cannot intervene in the eviction petition as a third person claiming ownership of the suit property and that his remedy lies elsewhere – The court relies on the settled law that one of the coowners or joint tenants can file or contest an eviction petition on behalf of the others and that the decision will be binding on all of them.

Relevant Paras:

16. The petitioner is yet to establish his status in the suit property as an owner, however, the petitioner is seeking impleadment into the eviction petition on the ground of being an LR of Sh. Madan Lal Gulati. The learned Trial Court has correctly considered that the petitioner is a joint tenant in the suit property. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to be impleaded as a defendant in an eviction petition as it is not necessary for all the tenants who are joint tenants to be arrayed as defendants in the eviction petition. The
petition filed by respondent no. 1 against respondent no. 2 is on the averments that they are in landlord-tenant relationship, therefore, the claim of the petitioner is impermissible in these circumstances as same cannot be adjudicated upon the present eviction petition.
17. Similar issue arose before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Anr. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla. (Dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 178 it has been held as under :-
“6……. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a
suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners…”

18. The above mentioned principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in FGP Ltd. vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and Anr. 2009(10) SCC 223.
19. In due consideration of the above laid principle of law, the petitioner cannot be permitted to be impleaded as a party in the present eviction petition as he is trying to set up a case adverse to that of respondent no. 1 which will render his eviction petition infructuous. It is needless to say that remedy of the petitioner lies elsewhere and the petitioner can bring his own suit seeking declaration of his ownership title.
20. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the order passed by learned ARC, consequently, the petition along with pending applications is dismissed leaving open the remedies of the petitioner against his brother.

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SUNIL GULATI VERSUS NASEEM AHMAD THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT

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Parambir Singh vs State of Punjab CRMM 45865/23 19/09/23 [ RAJBIR SEHRAWAT JUSTICE ] [ PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT ]

Section 439 CRPC Arms Act, Section 25 Indian Penal Code, Sections 379B and 34 Regular Bail Snatching of car with others Petitioner contends that the recovery of illegal arms and ammunition from their house is a planted evidence due to police animosity Held,

except for the recovery of the car outside the petitioner’s house and the presence of the person who snatched it along with some arms and ammunition recovered from the petitioner’s house, there is no direct allegation against the petitioner in the incident of snatching Petitioner has been in custody since July 17, 2023 – Bail granted.

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CRM-M_45865_2023_19_09_2023_FINAL_ORDER Parambir Singh vs State

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[ JHARKHAND HIGH COURT ]

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA (DB)

Sheikh Hesamuddin @ Kabir, s/o Sheikh Kutubuddin  vs State of Jharkhand CRLDB 1212/18 20/03/23

Section 302 IPC Arms Act, Section 27 Murder Appeal against conviction Prosecution relied on the confessional statement, eyewitness accounts, and a Test Identification Parade TIP for evidence Medical evidence clearly supports the prosecution story that Indrapal Singh suffered firearm injuries TIP conducted about two months after the occurrence was delayed, and the eyewitness accounts were unreliable Deceased died a homicidal death caused by firearm injuries is corroborated by the medical evidence Presence of appellant at place of occurrence is a highly incriminatory material Prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt Conviction set aside. [Paras 12, 18, 21, 22 and 23]

Relevant Paras:

12. PW2 and PW3 both have identified the appellant also in the dock and this piece of evidence has remained intact. No doubt identification of an unknown assailant for the first time in the Court is a weak piece of evidence but then if the evidence of dock identification is clear and does not admit any doubt the same is sufficient for recording conviction of the accused. In “Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)” (2010) 6 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the dock identification of an accused even though for the first time in the Court is above board the same can form the basis for conviction of the accused. The dock identification of the appellant is corroborated by his identification by PW2 and PW3 in the TIP. On 25th February 2010 when the appellant was put on the TIP, he was not known to PW2 and this is not a defence set-up by the appellant that he was known to PW2 who at the instance of the police or the informant has falsely identified him as the shooter. According to the prosecution, PW2 was present at the place of occurrence when the appellant fired at Indrapal Singh. The defence has challenged presence of PW2 at the place of occurrence and labelled him as a chance witness. But there is no law of universal application that the evidence of a chance witness cannot be accepted to record conviction of the accused. Moreover, there is another eyewitness PW3 who has come to the Court to identify the appellant as the shooter. The evidence of PW3 has been criticized on the ground that he is a police witness. However, this is not a proposition in law that the evidence of a police witness should be viewed with doubt and suspicion. Merely because a witness happens to be the police or official witness, the Court need not start with initial distrust and is required to accept his evidence tendered in the Court as truthful. The evidence of a police or official witness is also tested on the same yardstick as the evidence of any other witness and if it inspires confidence of the Court that must be accepted and can form the basis for conviction of the accused. In “State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil” (2001) 1 SCC 652 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officers should be approached with initial distrust.

18. PW1 Kamaljeet Singh who is the informant of this case has affirmed in the Court that his fardbeyan was recorded on 5th January 2010 at around 8:00 PM at TMH. He has stated in the Court that he saw the dead body of his brother drenched in blood lying in his car. He has further stated that the people from the locality who were present at the place of occurrence informed him that two assailants came on a motorcycle and fired shots at his brother. In a lengthy cross-examination, the defence has elicited from him that he does not know the persons who informed him that two motorcycle- borne assailants came and fired shot at his brother. However, he has denied the defence suggestion that it was some other person with whom he has enmity regarding brick-kiln who has murdered his brother. PW2 Jagannath Jamuda has stated in the Court that on the date of occurrence while returning from General Store near Road No. 15 he saw two assailants firing at a person who was driving the car. He has identified Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court as the person with long hairs who fired shots at the deceased. That description of the appellant given by PW2 in the Court is not challenged by the appellant. He has identified him also in the TIP conducted at Ghaghidih Central Jail, but in his cross-examination he has stated that he went to the jail with the police officer to identify the accused. He has also stated that before the TIP the same police officer brought him to the Court Hazat. He has further stated that the assailants came on a motorcycle, but he could not remember registration number of that motorcycle. PW3 Jag Narayan Sharma who is a constable has stated that on 5th January 2010 on direction of the Officer-in-Charge of Mango PS he was in search of the accused and, at about 5:45 PM, near Forest Nursery he saw that two persons on a motorcycle were trying to overtake a car. The person sitting on the back seat of the motorcycle fired shots at the car driver three times and after that they fled away towards Chepa Bridge. He has identified Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court by his face but he could not tell his name in the Court. In his cross-examination, he has stated that at the time of occurrence he was in search of the accused Gabbar Singh and, that, there was sufficient light on road. He has also denied the suggestion that it was dark at the place of occurrence. In response to a defence suggestion, he has stated that he did not see the accused Sheikh Hesamuddin in the Court Hazat after the occurrence.

21. The autopsy over the dead body of Indrapal Singh was conducted by a medical team constituting PW6, PW7 and PW11. There were as many as 3 firearm injuries caused to Indrapal Singh. The medical evidence clearly supports the prosecution story that Indrapal Singh suffered firearm injuries in the evening of 5th January 2010, at about 6:00 PM.

23. No doubt wherever it appears to the Court that two views are possible the view which favours the accused should be adopted by the Court. However, this is also a well-settled proposition in law that the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court which has the opportunity to observe the witnesses very closely must be given precedence and on minor inconsistencies the judgment of the trial Court can not be interfered by the appellate Court. In our opinion, PW2 and PW3 have remained unshaken in the Court and they did not waver from their previous statements made before the police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution has produced corroborative evidence through PW4 who is a witness of seizure of two empty cartridges and two pellets from the place of occurrence. PW5 who is the owner of Mahesh General Store at Road No.15 was in his shop in the evening of 5th January 2010 when he heard sounds of firing coming from a distance of 200-250 yards. This witness was declared hostile on a prayer made by the prosecution but from his evidence the prosecution story that in the evening of 5th January 2010 Indrapal Singh was fired upon near Road No.15 is corroborated. PW13 who was posted as In-Charge of Technical Cell at Jamshedpur has affirmed in the Court that the Investigating Officer of this case had filed requisition for CDRs and location of the mobile phones of the criminals which were obtained from the service providers for the mobile numbers 9122909541, 9709219196 and 9534210584. During the trial, there was no serious challenge by the appellant that none of the aforementioned mobile numbers was carried by him on the date of occurrence. The CDRs and location of those mobile numbers established presence of the appellant and other two accused persons near Mango and the adjacent places. This scientific evidence produced by the prosecution to establish presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence is a highly incriminating material which may not be of much help to prove the charge of the murder against the appellant but this evidence cannot be brushed aside on mere technical objections raised on behalf of the appellant.

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Sheikh Hesamuddin @ Kabir, s:o Sheikh Kutubuddin vs state of Jharkhand judgment High court the law literates

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Decided on: January 11, 2024
AMIT AGGARWAL VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

CORAM
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN

PMLA Act Section 3 and 4 Grant of Anticipatory Bail The petitioner, is seeking anticipatory bail in an ongoing money laundering investigation The Enforcement Directorate (ED) alleges that Petitioner was involved in a scheme to remit crores of rupees abroad using forged certificates and identities Petitioner argues that he was not involved in the scheme and that the ED’s case against him is based on the statements of cocons pirators who were coerced into making false accusations He also claims that he was physically assaulted by ED officials when he appeared for questioning – The ED contends that Petitioner was a key player in the scheme and that his fingerprints were found on some of the forged documents – The ED also points to the fact that Petitioner evaded questioning for several months before finally appearing before ED officials – The Delhi High Court has not yet ruled on Petitioner’s bail application The court is likely to weigh the evidence presented by both sides before making a decision The petitioner, a sick and infirm individual, is granted anticipatory bail after considering all facts, including co-accused statements under section 50 of PMLA, evidentiary value, no criminal activity, and the petitioner’s condition

Relevant Paras:

13. The counsel for the petitioner also argued that the twin conditions as per section 45 of PMLA are not applicable as the petitioner is a sick and infirm person and has already undergone repeated kidney surgeries and requires constant medical supervision and primarily relied upon Kewal Krishan Kumar (supra). The medical records/documents submitted by the petitioner reflect that the petitioner is suffering from various ailments including renal problem which requires constant medical treatment. This court in
Kewal Krishan Kumar (supra) has granted bail on ground of sickness and infirmity of the accused.
14. The CGSC also argued that the petitioner is avoiding investigation and his custodial investigation is required as the offence of money laundering involves multiple layers of placement, layering and integration. It is further argued that summons were issued to the petitioner to join investigation but the petitioner only joined investigation on 03.01.2023 and 04.01.2023 and subsequently avoided investigation. The CGSC also referred details of summons.

issued to the petitioner. The petitioner joined investigation on 03.01.2023 and 04.01.2023 and gave reasons for not joining investigation. The petitioner neither appears to be a flight risk, nor is he likely to influence any witness and tamper with the evidence.
15. This court in Vijay Agrawal (supra) also observed as under:-

22. The jurisprudence regarding bail is by now very well settled that rule has always been bail and its exception jail. It has also been stated time and again that such a principle has to be followed strictly. Right to bail is also essential for the reason that it provides the accused with an opportunity of securing fair trial. The right to bail is linked to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which confers right to live with
freedom and dignity. However, while protecting the right of an individual of freedom and liberty the court also has to consider the right of the society at large as well as the prosecuting agency. This is the reason that the gravity of the offence is required to be taken into account. The gravity of the offence is gathered from the attendant facts and circumstances of the case. It is a settled proposition that economic offences fall within the category of „grave offences.‟ While dealing with the economic offence cases, the court has to be sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused. Such economic offences normally involve the public exchequer and money of the honest tax
payer. The offence of money laundering in itself is a very serious offence. The money laundering not only is a threat to the financial health of the country but it may also adversely impact its integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, the act of money laundering can even lead to the collapse of the economic system.

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AMIT AGGARWAL. VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT THE LAW LITERATES JUDGMENT DELHI HIGH COURT

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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL S.L.P.(Crl.) No.3343 of 2022)
DINESH GUPTA VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

Reported Judgment 
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court of India has imposed a hefty fine of 25 lakh rupees in the Dinesh Gupta versus the state of Uttar Pradesh. This ruling follows a series of legal proceedings addressing grave allegations and ensuring justice. The case revolves around Mr. Dinesh Gupta, a resident of Uttar Pradesh, accused of committing a serious offense that attracted significant public attention. The Supreme Court thoroughly examined the evidence, considering the constitutionality of the allegations and the impact on society. The fine serves as a strong deterrent for similar offenses and highlights the importance of maintaining law and order while respecting fundamental rights and principles of justice. This decision has broader implications for legal precedence in Uttar Pradesh and India.

Relevant Paras 

Unscrupulous litigants should not be allowed to
go scot-free. They should be put to strict termsand conditions including costs. It is time to check with firmness such litigation initiated and laced with concealment, falsehood, and forum hunting. Even State actions or conduct of government servants being party to such malicious litigation should be seriously reprimanded. In the instant case, we find initiation of criminal proceedings before a forum which had no territorial jurisdiction by submitting incorrect facts and giving frivolous reasons to entertain such complaints. A closer look at the respondent’s actions reveals more than just an inappropriate use of jurisdiction. The core issue of the dispute, which involves financial transactions and agreements, clearly places it in the realm of civil and commercial law. Yet, the respondent chose to pursue criminal charges in a quest to abuse thecriminal justice system with a motive to seek personal vengeance rather than seeking true justice. This unnecessary turning of a civil matter into a criminal case not only overburdens the criminal justice system but also violates the principles of fairness and right conduct in legal matters. The apparent misuse of criminal proceedings in this case not only damages trust in our legal system but also sets a harmful precedent if not addressed.
3. A common order1 passed by the High Court2 dismissing the petitions filed by the appellants seeking quashing of the summoning order3 has been impugned in the present appeals.

34. The entire factual matrix and the time lines clearly reflects that the complainant deliberately and unnecessarily has caused substantial delay and had been waiting for opportune moment for initiating false and frivolous litigation.
35. Further, it has been noticed by the High Court in the impugned order that on an application filed by the appellants, an Arbitrator was appointed by the Delhi High Court vide order dated 15.05.2019 to settle the dispute amongst the parties and the said matter was still pending.
36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the FIR in question, if proceeded further, will result in absolute abuse of process of court. It is a clear case of malicious prosecution. Hence, the same is required to be quashed.

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DINESH GUPTA VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. Judgement_11-Jan-2024 The Law Literates

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CRM-M-11983-2022 (O&M)
Date of Decision:- 09.1.2023 

CRM-M-14561-2022 (O&M)
High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana At Chandigarh
(Anil Naggar Versus State of Haryana)

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL

PC ACT Section 7 Fraud job Scam Bail Accused being owner of hired Software Agency in connivance with petitioner allotted the work of online application portal by Haryana Public Service Commission had been securing jobs for various applicants by fraudulent means and were earning crores of rupees Complainant alleged that the modus operandi was that the said persons used to ask the candidates to attempt only 30-40 questions and to keep blank the remaining answers so that the same could be ticked as correct subsequently in OMR sheets Without commenting anything as regards the merits of the case but while noticing that the petitioners have been behind bars for a substantial period and otherwise enjoy a clean record and also that conclusion of trial is likely to consume time inasmuch as trial has not even commenced and charges are yet to be framed, further detention of the petitioners is not justified – Petition accepted and petitioners are ordered to be released on bail Appeal allowed

Relevant Paras 

4. Opposing the petitions, learned State counsel has submitted that in the present case sufficient evidence has been collected during the course of investigation so as to establish the complicity of the petitioners and that an amount of more than Rs.3 crores has been recovered apart from audio recording, FSL reports, WhatsApp chat and the opinion regarding hand-writing which would all indicate that the petitioners were hand in gloves with each other for the purpose of committing this fraud. Learned State counsel has submitted that while petitioner-Naveen was caught red handed at the spot when the complainant handed over an amount of Rs.20 lakhs to him, co- accused Ashish came to be nominated pursuant to the disclosure statement made by said Naveen and said Ashwani further nominated Anil Daggar HCS and clearly indicated his involvement. It has further been informed that the Pawan Gupta also came to be nominated on the basis of statement of Ashwani Sharma who clearly stated that Pawan Gupta had referred 5 candidates out of which 4 came to be selected but of course by dubious means. Learned State counsel has however, informed that while Naveen, Ashwani and Anil Daggar have been behind bars since the last more than 1 year, Pawan Gupta has been behind bars for the last 6/7 months. It has also been informed that none of the petitioners otherwise is involved in any other case. Learned State counsel has informed that charges are yet to be framed and as many as a total of 57 PWs have been cited.

5. This Court has considered the rival submissions.

6. Without commenting anything as regards the merits of the case but while noticing that the petitioners have been behind bars for a substantial period and otherwise enjoy a clean record and also that conclusion of trial is likely to consume time inasmuch as trial has not even commenced and charges are yet to be framed, further detention of the petitioners is not justified. The petitions, as such, are accepted and the petitioners are ordered to be released on bail subject to their furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of learned trial Court/Chief Judicial Magistrate/Duty Magistrate concerned.

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Anil Naggar Vs State of Haryana 09_01_2023_FINAL_ORDER The Law Literates

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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
APPEAL NO. 163 of 2010

DARSHAN SINGH VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB
(Judgment Of Three Benches)

J. (B. R. Gavai)
J. (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha)
J. (Aravind Kumar)

If the Prosecution Witnesses had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon.

#SupremeCourt observed  in Darshan Singh vs State of Punjab 2024

So, SC technically halted misuse of application u/s 319 CRPC against those persons who are not kept in column no. 2 of chargesheet or have been summoned in a case due to false implication/enmity?

Relevant Paras

25. In the face of the above evidence on record, can it be said that the presence of the appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s house in the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99, has been firmly and cogently established? According to us, the answer must be in the negative. There are several omissions that have been brought out in the cross examination of PW-3 and PW-4, which seriously dent the credibility of their testimony.
26. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See : (i) Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 (ii) Sunil Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (72) ACC 699 (SC). (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur Vs. State of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble Vs. Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175]

27. Of course, PW-3 claims to be an illiterate witness and therefore, her testimony must be interpreted in that light. We are cognizant that the appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence. This Court has held that the evidence of a rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition.3
28. However, the testimony of PW-3 suffers not merely from technical imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. However, such is not the case here. PW-3 had only heard from her husband that the appellant and Rani Kaur were seen together in the appellant’s house on 18.05.99. To that extent, it is merely hearsay. Moreover, PW-4 has omitted to state this fact to PW3 in his statement before the police. He has also omitted to state that he advised his wife (PW-3) against going to the
appellant’s house in the night since there may arise a quarrel between all of them. If these facts are ignored from consideration, we only wonder as to why PW-3 would visit the house of the appellant in the wee hours of the morning on 19.05.99. It seems quite unnatural for PW-3 to visit the house of the appellant at 430 am in the morning without any reason. If PW-3 was aware that the appellant and Rani Kaur were in an illicit relationship for a sufficiently long duration, there was no reason to suspect all of a sudden that the two of them would get together, administer poison and murder the deceased on 19.05.1999, which fact, prompted her to visit the house of the appellant at such odd hours in the morning. Both the Courts have failed to take notice of the several significant omissions and improvements in the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4.

37. Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances. There cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC 281.]

38. Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent findings of conviction.
…

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DARSHAN SINGH VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB J U D G M E NT THE lLAW LITERATES

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI  CRL.A. No. 13/2013
VIKAS GUPTA @ BOBBY  Vs  STATE

CORAM
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE ANU MALHOTRA

• Murder By the instant appeal, the appellant assails the judgment passed in SC arising out of FIR, holding the appellant guilty of commission of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC with which he was charged as well as the order awarding sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.10,000/and in default of payment of fine, ordering simple imprisonment for six months Even the investigating officer had informed the doctor that the “deceased had consumed an unknown substance after a quarrel with her husband at home” On a conjoint readings of the DD No.39B; the MLC; the marginal note on the post mortem report, which is corroborated by the first statement of Master ‘M’, and statement of the daughter of the deceased it has to be held that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had duped the deceased into consuming a poisonous substance more specifically Organo – phosphorous pesticide (Dichlor VOS) leading to her death — The judgment as well as the order of sentence awarding sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.10,000/and in default of payment of fine, ordering simple imprisonment for six months are not sustainable and are hereby set aside and quashed.

Relevant Paras :

39. The MLC records this very disclosure by Himanshu, son of the deceased to the doctor. The marginal note on the post mortem report Ex.PW-15/A also states that the history disclosed by the investigating officer was that the deceased had consumed some unknown substance after quarrel with her husband at home. No allegation was made that the same had been offered to her by the husband.
40. The marginal note on the post mortem report and the MLC shows that the deceased had been rushed to hospital by her husband, the present appellant with the alleged history of ingestion of some unknown substance. The appellant alleges that all these circumstances proved on the record establish that the appellant could not have been held guilty for commission of the offence with which he was charged. We find substance in these submissions.
41. We extract hereunder the material explanation given by the appellant when the evidence regarding the commission of the offence was put to him under Section 313 of the CrPC:

“Q.17 It is further in evidence against you that PW-2 Himanshu Gupta, your son and PW-3 Baby Samishtha, your daughter, both have deposed that you used to drink daily and pick up quarrel with deceased Bharti Gupta. They have also stated that on 20.09.2009, their mother had gone to market to purchase vegetables and she became late and when she returned, you were under influence of liquor and started abusing her and beating her. What you have to say?
Ans. It is incorrect.
Q.18 ItisfurtherinevidenceagainstyouthatPW2& 3 have also stated that you continued beating Bharti till next day i.e. 21.09.09. you again started quarrel with Bharti and at around 2:15 p.m. Their mother being fed up with you uttered words that “isse acha hai ki main mar jaon” on which you gave insecticide (used for killing cockroaches) mixed in water to their mother and since said insecticide (used for killing cockroaches) mixed in water to their mother and since said insecticide after mixing with water was still transparent like water, she consumed the same as a result of which jhag started coming out of her moth and she started vomiting. What you have to say?
Ans. It is incorrect. I never gave any insecticide to Bharti at any point of time. Rather at the time when she consumed insecticide, I was not present at home.
I came at the spot later on and on finding Bharti in the intoxicated condition, I rushed her to hospital for her treatment. The allegations levelled against me is false and totally baseless. Deceased Bharti was fed up and used to remain tense as my daughter Kajal was not being given by my father-in-law and mother-in- law as she was very lucky to them. My wife used to make various request to them to return her to us as she might be very lucky for us but they were adamant not to return her. On 20.09.09, my wife went to her parental home to take our daughter kajal being very lucky but they flatly refused and they scolded her not to come again for this purpose. I used to work with my inlaws at their kite shop for the period from January, 2009 upto 20.09.2009 and I have also been given a sum of Rs.20,000/- by my father in law. I also used to take the payment during this period from time to time. My relation with my wife were very cordial. The demonstration with dead body was also held on 22.09.09 by my inlaws, other people including the Leaders of Political parties in the mohalla and also at the Police Station after that police came in action and a DD no. 18A was made and after that the statements were recorded and the false FIR was registered in which I have been falsely implicated by the police.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. 24 Do you want to say anything else?
Ans. I am innocent and have been falsely implicated in this case. I never gave any insecticide to Bharti at any point of time. Rather at the time when she consumed insecticide, I was not present at home. I came at the spot later on and on finding Bharti in the intoxicated condition, I rushed her to hospital for her treatment. The allegations levelled against me is false and totally baseless. Deceased Bharti was fed up and
used to remain tense as my daughter Kajal was not being given by my father-in-law and mother-in-law as she was very lucky to them. My wife used to make various request to them to return her to us as she might be very lucky for us but they were adamant not to return her. On 20.09.09, my wife went to her parental home to take our daughter kajal being very lucky but they flatly refused and they scolded her not to come again for this purpose. I used to work with my inlaws at their kite shop for the period from January, 2009 upto 20.09.2009 and I have also been given a sum of Rs.20,000/- by my father in law. I also used to take the payment during this period from time to time. My relation with my wife were very cordial. The demonstration with dead body was also held on 22.09.09 by my inlaws, other people including the Leaders of Political parties in the mohalla and also at the Police Station after that police came in action and a DD no. 18A was made and after that the statements were recorded and the false FIR was registered in which I have been falsely implicated by the police.”
42. On a conjoint readings of the DD No.39B; the MLC No.7539/09 EX.PW-13/A; the marginal note on the post mortem report dated 22nd September, 2009, which is corroborated by the first statement dated 21st September, 2009 (Ex.PW-2/B) of Master Himanshu @ Honey, and statement dated 21st September, 2009 (EX.PW-18/C) of the daughter of the deceased, namely, Samishtha, it has to be held that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had duped the deceased Bharti Gupta into consuming a poisonous substance more specifically
Organo – phosphorous pesticide (Dichlor VOS) leading to her death.
43. In view thereof, the judgment dated 17th July, 2012 as well as the order of sentence dated 20th July, 2012 awarding sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, ordering simple imprisonment for six months are not sustainable and are hereby set aside and quashed.

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1205 OF 2021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
VED PAL & ANR. VS STATE OF HARYANA
JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI 

• Section 376(2) (g), 342 read with Section 34 IPC Rape Acquittal Conviction on based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix In the evidence of prosecutrix as well as in the evidence of PW2, it has come on record that there are three houses in between the house of the prosecutrix and house of the accused, where the incident is alleged to have taken place It is clear that even according to the prosecution, the prosecutrix was dragged from her house to the house of accused It is difficult to believe that, at that time, the prosecutrix did not make any cries/hues It is further to be noted that in the medical evidence, the Doctor has specifically stated that no injuries were found on the person of the prosecutrix Though he has opined that the possibility of the sexual intercourse could not be ruled out, he has also stated that the possibility of intercourse earlier to the MLR cannot be ruled out – It is further to be noted that the FSL report further finds that no semen was found on the clothes of the prosecutrix or on the vaginal swab – Semen was found on the underwear of accused – It is to be noted that the accused have taken a specific defence that there was a civil dispute between grand-father of the appellant(s) and the grand-father of the prosecutrix – No doubt that the said suggestion is once denied by the prosecutrix and on other occasion she has stated that she is not aware about the same – Though the prosecutrix admits the letter addressed by her to accused, in the next blush, she states that she has neither visited the house of the accused nor accused has visited to her house – Taking into consideration the fact that the both the prosecutrix and the appellant(s) reside within the vicinity of three houses, the said version is difficult to believe – Prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the doubt – Appeal allowed.

Relevant Paras:

9. However, in the present case, upon the consideration of the entire evidence together, we find that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
10. In the evidence of prosecutrix as well as in the evidence of P.W.2, it has come on record that there are three houses in between the house of the prosecutrix and house of the accused Suresh, where the incident is alleged to have taken place.
11. As such, it is clear that even according to the prosecution, the prosecutrix was dragged from her house to the house of accused Suresh. It is difficult to believe that, at that time, the prosecutrix did not make any cries/hues.
12. It is further to be noted that in the medical evidence, the Doctor has specifically stated that no injuries were found on the person of the prosecutrix. Though he has opined that the possibility of the sexual intercourse could not be ruled out, he has also stated that the possibility of intercourse earlier to the MLR cannot be ruled out. It is further to be noted that the FSL report further finds that no semen was found on the clothes of the prosecutrix or on the vaginal swab. The semen was found on the underwear of accused Suresh.

13. It is to be noted that the accused have taken a specific defence that there was a civil dispute between grand-father of the appellant(s) and the grand-father of the prosecutrix. No doubt that the said suggestion is once denied by the prosecutrix and on other occasion she has stated that she is not aware about the same. Though the prosecutrix admits the letter addressed by her to accused Suresh, in the next blush, she states that she has
neither visited the house of the has visited to her house. consideration the fact that prosecutrix and the appellant(s) vicinity of three houses, the difficult to believe.

14. In the totality of the circumstances, we find that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The accused are entitled to benefit of doubt.
15. The impugned judgment and order dated 15th July, 2019 passed by the High Court as well as the orders dated 28th January, 2004/29th January, 2004 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Adhoc) are quashed and set aside and the appeal is allowed.

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