Major vs State Of Punjab CRMM 25822/23 22/05/23 [ HARPREET JJ ]

[ PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT ]

• Sections 73, 446 and 482 CRPC Forfeiture of surety bond Mere absence of the accused on one date before trial Court in itself is not sufficient to conclude that he is evading his arrest and cannot be sole ground for issuance of non bailable warrants Courts can most certainly take into consideration conduct of accused if he is impeding progress of trial and is on earlier occasion he was declared proclaimed offender and on account of his continuous absence from trial, trial considerably protracted and his past behaviour is relevant for purpose of recording satisfaction under relevant provisions of Code – Hence, forfeiture and cancellation of surety bonds including issuance of nonbailable warrants set aside.

29. In view of the factual position of the law discussed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that for passing any orders in terms of Section 73(1), Section 82(1), Section 446 of the Code, the recording of the satisfaction with regard to evading of the arrest, the willful concealment and breach of the conditions of the bail bond is absolutely necessary. The constitutional protection provided under Article 21 requires that the accused must be granted opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice before any adverse order curtailing a person’s liberty is passed. The Courts cannot issue non bailable warrants in a routine manner without following the drill prescribed under the Code. The Court is required to record its satisfaction on the basis of material available on record and atleast assign reasons for concluding that the accused is willfully evading his arrest and the warrants cannot be executed. The non-bailable warrants are only to be issued after exhausting the other methods of securing the presence of the accused. Mere absence of the accused on one date before the trial Court in itself is not sufficient to conclude that he is evading his arrest and cannot be the sole ground for issuance of non bailable warrants. The Courts can most certainly take into consideration the conduct of the accused if he is impeding the progress of the trial and is on earlier occasion he was declared a proclaimed offender and on account of his continuous absence from the trial, the trial has been considerably protracted. His past behaviour is a relevant for the purpose of recording satisfaction under the relevant provisions of the Code.

30. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the learned trial Court has not followed the drill of the procedure provided under Sections 73, 82, 446 of the Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin Vs. Union of India 2020(3) SCC 637 has laid down the ratio that the procedural safeguards provided under the statute are required ot be mandatorily followed and following was observed:
“98. We also direct that all the above procedural safeguards, as elucidated by us, need to be mandatorily followed. In this context, this Court in the Hukam Chand Shyam Lal case (supra), observed as follows:
“18. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other amodes (sic) of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature…” (emphasis supplied).”
31. The sole purpose for cancellation of bail bonds or issuance of proclamation is to secure presence of the accused. The petitioner in the present case undertakes to appear before the learned trial Court on each and every date.
32. The learned State counsel is not able to controvert the factual position as well as the settled law on the issue at hand.
CONCLUSION
33. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 20.12.2022 and 03.04.2023 Annexure P-5 and P-6, respectively, passed by the learned trial Court are set aside and the petitioner is directed to appear before the learned trial Court on or before 03.07.2023 and on his doing so the learned trial Court shall admit him to bail on furnishing of fresh bail

For read the judgment click here 

CRM-M_25822_2023_22_05_2023_FINAL_ORDER Major Singh @ Major vs State of Punjab

All rights reserved (𝔸𝕕𝕧 Vaibhav Tomar)

R.MANIKANDAN Vs. STATE CRLA 105/16 01/03/23 [ ANAND JJ ]
[ MADRAS HIGH COURT ]

• Section 306 IPC Indian Evidence Act Section 113A Abetment of Suicide Demand of Dowry and Cruelty Appeal against conviction Evidence of father, brothers, sister and uncle of deceased showed that entire family was opposed to deceased marrying Appellant Neighbours stated that appellant and deceased were living happily and that they were not able to see any conflict between both of them Incident took place when the appellant was not in house Appellant did not run away nor absconded after incident and he, in fact, cut the shawl, in which, the deceased was hanging, brought down the deceased, attempted to sprinkle water in her face and informed the neighbours Evidence does not establish cruelty meted out by appellant to deceased Court below has virtually proceeded on an assumption that the appellant was the reason behind the suicide committed by deceased Held, how so ever high the suspicion is, the same cannot replace the test of proving the case beyond reasonable doubts by the prosecution Impugned judgment of conviction, set aside Appeal allowed. [Paras 15, 16, 20 and 22]

Relevant Paras

15. The neighbours, who were examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer, have, in one voice, stated that the appellant and the deceased Rubini were living happily and that they were not able to see any conflict between both of them. The appellant, while giving the statement to the Revenue Divisional Officer, has stated that on 16.3.2008, there was a small misunderstanding between the appellant and the deceased Rubini while they were having food. There was some quarrel between each other. The next day, the appellant left the home and admittedly, the incident took place when the appellant was not in the house. The appellant has attributed this incident to the hyper sensitivity of the deceased Rubini and her over reaction for an innocuous incident.
16. The appellant did not run away nor absconded after the incident and he, in fact, cut the shawl, in which, the deceased was hanging, brought down the deceased, attempted to sprinkle water in her face and informed the neighbours. Thereafter, he also called KMF hospital and the deceased was taken to the hospital. From there, they were directed to go to the Government Hospital at Kothagiri where the deceased was declared ‘brought dead’ at about 11.45 AM. Hence, the appellant was very much available with the deceased after the incident and the conduct of the appellant does not show anything unnatural or point to any suspicion against the appellant.

20. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 does not establish any cruelty meted out by the appellant to the deceased Rubini. On the other hand, almost all the neighbours, who gave their statements to the Revenue Divisional Officer, have stated that the appellant and the deceased were living happily. The appellant had also cited an incident that took place the previous day, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered as an abetment for committing suicide and at the best, it can only be held to be hyper sensitiveness on the part of the deceased. This is on the presumption that it is this incident, which led to the commission of suicide by the deceased Rubini.
21. It must be borne in mind that the deceased Rubini never got any support from her family and it is not known as to whether there was any serious misgiving between the deceased Rubini and her family members and whether the same was also one of the contributing factors, which ultimately led to the commission of suicide by Rubini.

22. The Court below has virtually proceeded on an assumption that the appellant was the reason behind the suicide committed by Rubini. It is now too well settled that how so ever high the suspicion is, the same cannot replace the test of proving the case beyond reasonable doubts by the prosecution.
23. In the light of the above discussions, this Court has absolutely no hesitation to interfere with the judgment rendered by the Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethimandram (FTMC), Ooty in S.C.No.4 of 2014, dated 25.11.2015 and accordingly, the same is hereby set aside. The above criminal appeal is allowed. The appellant was enlarged on bail by this Court by an order dated 21.3.2016 vide Crl.M.P.No.1504 of 2016. In this judgment, since the appellant is acquitted from the charge under Section 306 of the Code, the bail bonds executed shall stand canceled and the fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him.

click here for read the judgment

R.Manikandan Vs State by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Coonoor Sub-Division, Kotagiri Police Station, Nilgiri District The law literates

All rights reserved (𝔸𝕕𝕧 Saba Hasan )

JAVAHAR vs OVT INDIA PVT. LIMITED CRLMC 1255/20 08/08/22

[ Hon’ble Justice Asha Memon   ]

[ DELHI HIGH COURT ]

• Section 482 CRPC NI ACT Sections 138 and 141 Quashing of proceedings Petition for Petitioner is not responsible for and in-charge of the business of the accused company It is not pleaded in the complaints that the dishonoured cheques had been signed by petitioner Documents show that the petitioner though a Director of the accused company was not incharge of or responsible for the conduct of its business Thus, an essential ingredient of Section 141 NI ACT based on which vicarious liability could be attached to the petitioner is missing Petition allowed.

Relevant paras 

8. While it is correct that there can be no deemed liability of Directors, there is a simultaneous requirement that when the petitioner seeks the quashing of a complaint, there is an onus on the petitioner to furnish some kind of sterling and incontrovertible material or other reasonable circumstances to substantiate his contention that he was not in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company. A complaint cannot be quashed merely on the ground that no particulars are given in the complaint about his role if the basic averment was sufficient to make out a case in the complaint. (Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd vs. Anu Mehta and Ors (2015) 1 SCC 103).
9. Turning to the petitions at hand, the copy of the complaint has been filed as Annexure P-1 in each petition. In the compliants, Pantel Technologies Private Limited is accused No.1, the petitioner Javahar Lal is accused No.2 and Vivek Prakash is accused No.3, both of whom have been described as Directors. In Para No.2 of the complaints, it is mentioned that accused No.2 and 3, that is, the petitioner and other Director had approached the complaint for the manufacture and supply of 12,000 STBs Units @12.75 per unit. This is stated to have been done for and on behalf of the accused No.1 company. The words further used, as has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are that the complaints merely state that the accused No.2 and 3 are the Directors of the accused No.1/company and responsible for the day to day affairs of the accused No.1/company.

13. But again, that will not suffice. The MoU, the Tripartite and Sale Agreements placed on the record as P-2 and P-3 dated 18th September, 2018 and 2nd December, 2018 have been executed between M/s Pantel Technologies Private Ltd., M/s OVT India Pvt. Ltd. and Independent TV Ltd. The petitioner claims that he has not signed these agreements, which is substantiated from the very documents. The first Tripartite Agreement has been signed by Mr. Vijender Singh for and on behalf of. M/s Pantel Technologies Private Ltd., and the second agreement has been signed by Mr. Vivek Prakash i.e., accused No.3 in the complaint. In other words, the document relied upon by the respondents does not reflect the fact that the petitioner while being a Director of the accused company was participating in the conduct of the business by entering into trade agreements on behalf of the company. The averments do not find support from the very documents relied upon by the complainant/respondent.
14. Thus the petitioner is not responsible for and in-charge of the business of the accused company. It is not pleaded in the complaints that the dishonoured cheques had been signed by the petitioner. Nor has it been so urged before this Court. Thus, the averments made in the complaints even if be fully accepted, the documents annexed thereto ex facie show that the petitioner though a Director of the accused company was not in-charge of or responsible for the conduct of its business. Thus,

an essential ingredient of Section 141 N.I. Act based on which vicarious liability could be attached to the petitioner is missing.
15. The position of law being what it, is no two views can be taken in the present matters. The complaint cases qua the petitioner are required to be and are quashed.

Click here for read the judgment 

Javahar lal vs OVT INDIA PVT. LIMITED & ANR. Judgment delhi high court the law literates

all rights reserved (Vaibhav Tomar 𝔸𝕕𝕧 )